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Brennan: Keeping the Dangerous Behind Bars: Redefining What a Sexually Vio

KEEPING THE DANGEROUS BEHIND BARS:
REDEFINING WHAT A SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PERSON IS IN ILLINOIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a man named Mr. Doe slowly driving a car down a
secluded neighborhood street.1 Mr. Doe has a checkered past. In 1990,
at the age of twenty-five, he was arrested after tying his four-year-old
stepson to a bed. Mr. Doe’s wife got home from work at about the same
time, so nothing further happened. The stepson told his mother, who
did not believe him. The stepson then told a preschool teacher who
alerted police. The charges were dropped, however, when Mr. Doe’s
wife convinced her son that he was just imagining things. Five years and
a divorce later, Mr. Doe was arrested for sexually assaulting a sevenyear-old boy near a local little league field. Mr. Doe snatched and
undressed the boy but was caught before things went further. He was
later convicted and served a fourteen-year prison sentence. Mr. Doe has
been out of prison for a year.
An eight-year-old boy walks home from school. It is a beautiful day,
so the boy decided to take the long way home. As the boy walks, Mr.
Doe approaches him, his car creeping down the street. Mr. Doe tells the
boy that his parents are looking for him and that he was expected home
twenty minutes ago. Mr. Doe then offers the boy a ride home, which the
boy accepts. Two hours later, the boy is dumped in a ditch. He is
covered in blood, semen, dirt, and sweat. The boy has been raped.
Could this terrible ordeal have been avoided?
In Illinois, the answer is maybe.2 The Illinois Sexually Violent
Persons Commitment Act (“SVPA”) permits the civil commitment of
sexually violent persons (“SVPs”).3 This commitment, typically imposed
after the completion of a prison sentence, is allowed if the individual has
This scenario, loosely based on the case of Earl Shriner that sparked the Washington
sexual predator law, was created by the Notewriter to illustrate a context in which the
Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act would likely be invoked.
2
See generally 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008) (defining and regulating
sexually dangerous persons).
3
See id. (allowing for the civil commitment of SVPs). When discussing the SVPA
throughout this Note, the author will use two terms—“sexually violent person” and “SVP.”
While they refer to the same thing, the term will be spelled out as sexually violent person
when referring to the specific language used in the SVPA. When referring to a sexually
violent person in passing or when describing statutory procedures, the author will use
SVP. For the purposes of this Note, the SVPA and similar laws in other jurisdictions will
collectively be referred to as “sexual predator legislation” or “sexual predator laws.” Those
eligible for commitment under such laws, unless designated otherwise or referring to
specific statutory language, will be referred to as “sexually violent individuals.”
1
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a mental disorder that makes him or her substantially probable to engage in
sexual violence.4 The importance of the specific language used in the
SVPA cannot be overstated.5 Potentially indefinite civil commitment
depends on the specific terminology used.6 More importantly, the
constitutionality of a sexual predator law turns on its specific statutory
language because there are certain constitutionally required elements of
civil commitment that must be present for a sexual predator law to
survive.7 These elements are built into specific statutory terms and
definitions.8 In the SVPA’s case, some of the most crucial statutory
language used to define a “mental disorder” has been ignored.9
Additionally, the SVPA’s commitment standard of “substantially
probable” is unique to Illinois and different from what has been
constitutionally approved.10
The purpose of this Note is to offer a model interpretation of the
SVPA’s “mental disorder” definition and to suggest a change in the
SVPA’s “substantially probable” standard.11 These adjustments will
both increase the SVPA’s applicability to sexually violent individuals
and uphold the SVPA’s constitutionality.12 Part II of this Note discusses
the history of the SVPA, including general background information that
led to the SVPA’s passing, the SVPA’s key language and judicial
interpretation, and other important terms and authorities.13 Part III
Id. at 207/5(f).
See infra notes 6–8 (explaining how indefinite civil commitment turns on specific
terminology and how sexual predator laws are only constitutional if certain requirements
are contained in statutory language).
6
See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/65(a)(2) (calling for a civilly committed
individual’s discharge petition to be denied if the state can prove the individual is still an
SVP as defined in the statute).
7
See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 798–99 (Ill. 2003) (stating that a sexual
predator law satisfies substantive due process if it contains definitions that supply the
constitutionally required elements of civil commitment).
8
See id. (explaining that the constitutionally required elements are built into specific
statutory language and definitions).
9
See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining how the “emotional capacity” language in the SVPA’s
mental disorder definition has been ignored).
10
See infra notes 99–100 (discussing the various commitment standards that states use in
their sexual predator laws).
11
See infra Part IV (proposing that the “mental disorder” definition in the SVPA be
interpreted differently and that the SVPA’s standard for commitment be lowered from
“substantially probable” to “likely”).
12
See infra Part IV (demonstrating that the suggested changes will maintain the SVPA’s
constitutionality while simultaneously increasing its applicability).
13
See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of sexual predator legislation and how
modern sexual predator laws have emerged); infra Part II.B (looking at the key United
States Supreme Court decisions that upheld the constitutionality of modern sexual
predator laws); infra Part II.C.1 (defining the SVPA’s key terminology); infra Part II.C.2
4
5
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analyzes the statutory language used in the SVPA, along with its current
interpretation.14 Finally, Part IV proposes a model interpretation of the
SVPA’s “mental disorder” definition, and suggests a change to the
SVPA’s “substantially probable” standard.15
II. BACKGROUND
A certain group of individuals will predictably commit future acts of
sexual violence.16 If these sexually violent individuals are handled solely
by the criminal justice system, many of them will serve their prison
terms, re-enter society, and then prey on more innocent victims.17
Reacting to this crack in the criminal justice system, a number of states
have enacted laws allowing for the involuntary civil commitment and
treatment of sexually violent persons.18 While states use varying terms

(covering the SVPA’s approval in light of the United States Supreme Court opinions on
sexual predator legislation); infra Part II.D.1 (summarizing the language used in other
jurisdictions’ sexual predator laws); infra Part II.D.2 (looking at dictionary definitions of
terms that are found in the SVPA, as well as key mental health authorities).
14
See infra Part III.A.1 (looking at the key inquiry under the SVPA and explaining that
this inquiry is covered by using only a portion of the current statutory language); infra Part
III.A.2 (discussing why the mental health community’s language is not decisive in
determining SVPA civil commitments); infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the current standard
used in committing individuals pursuant to the SVPA); infra Part III.B.2 (explaining why
the current standard cannot be broken down into precise mathematical terms).
15
See infra Part IV.A (stating that the emotional capacity language in the SVPA’s
definition of a “mental disorder” needs to be given meaning); infra Part IV.B (proposing
that the Illinois legislature lower the SVPA’s commitment standard from “substantially
probable” to “likely”).
16
Norm Maleng, The Community Protection Act and the Sexually Violent Predators Statute,
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 821, 823 (1992); see 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons
§ 125 (2006) (noting that there are certain individuals who, because of a mental condition,
commit or have a propensity to commit sex offenses); see also Debra T. Landis, Annotation,
Standard of Proof Required Under Statute Providing for Commitment of Sexual Offenders or Sexual
Psychopaths, 96 A.L.R.3d 840, § 2 (1979) (explaining that there are individuals with
psychopathic disorders which cause them to commit sex offenses).
17
Maleng, supra note 16, at 823.
18
See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–3717 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 6600–6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2009); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–3811 (2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 394.910–.932 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West
2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5929a01–29a22 (2005 & Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 632.480–.513 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1201–1226 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 135-E:1–24 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24–.38 (West 2008); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01–24
(2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10–170 (2002 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900–
920 (2005 & Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.903 (West 2008 & Supp.
2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.14 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008). The New York sexual
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to label these sexually violent individuals, Illinois labels them as
“sexually violent persons” and commits them pursuant to the SVPA.19
predator law, passed in 2007, helps explain why sexual predator legislation is needed by
stating that
some sex offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them to
engage in repeated sex offenses. These offenders may require longterm specialized treatment modalities to address their risk to reoffend.
They should receive such treatment while they are incarcerated as a
result of the criminal process, and should continue to receive treatment
when that incarceration comes to an end.
In extreme cases,
confinement of the most dangerous offenders will need to be extended
by civil process in order to provide them such treatment and to protect
the public from their recidivistic conduct.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(b). While there are many states with sexual predator laws,
there is also some federal legislation on the topic. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006) (allowing for
the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals). The Attorney General may
certify that someone in federal prison is a sexually dangerous person; a hearing is then
ordered. Id. § 4248(a). If the court finds the person is a sexually dangerous person, he is
committed to the custody of the Attorney General, who releases the person to the custody
of the person’s home state or state where the person was tried. Id. § 4248(d). If the State
will not take control of the person, the Attorney General places the person in a facility. Id.
This law, enacted in 2006, recently passed constitutional scrutiny. See United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010). There is also a federal law authorizing the Attorney
General to give grants to states that pass sexual predator laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 16971 (2006).
To go along with sexual predator laws there are other methods of dealing with sex
offenders and those considered sexually violent, including registration laws, community
notification laws, and residency restrictions. Caleb Durling, Never Going Home: Does It
Make Us Safer? Does It Make Sense? Sex Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk
Management Law, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Liberty
Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community
Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1169 (1999). Chemical castration, the
process of pharmacological treatment that deprives individuals of the ability to experience
sexual desire and engage in sexual activity, is also used in some circumstances. John F.
Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and
the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 561 (2006). This Note will not discuss
these methods further because it focuses on the statutory language found in the Illinois
sexual predator law, not the merits of other systems.
19
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–3717
(“Sexually Violent Persons”); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (“Sexually Violent
Predators”); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–3811 (“sexual psychopath[s]”); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 394.910–.932 (“Sexually Violent Predators”); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (“Sexually
Violent Predators”); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01–29a22 (“Sexually Violent Predators”);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (“Sexually Dangerous Persons”); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 253B.185 (“sexually dangerous persons or persons with a sexual psychopathic
personality”); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480–.513 (“Sexually Violent Predators”); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 71-1201–1226 (“dangerous sex offenders”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-E:1–24
(“Sexually Violent Predators”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24–.38 (“sexually violent
predator[s]”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (“Sex Offenders Requiring Civil
Commitment or Supervision”); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01–24 (“Sexually dangerous
individual[s]”); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10–170 (“Sexually Violent Predator[s]”); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 37.2-900–920 (“Sexually Violent Predators”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/4

Brennan: Keeping the Dangerous Behind Bars: Redefining What a Sexually Vio

2011]

Redefining Sexually Violent Person in Illinois

555

Part II discusses the history of sexual predator legislation, looking in
depth at the SVPA and other key terminology used in modern sexual
predator laws.20 Specifically, Part II.A discusses the history and
development of sexual predator legislation up until the SVPA was
passed.21 Part II.B discusses the United States Supreme Court’s views on
the civil commitment of sexually violent individuals under sexual
predator laws, which are similar to the SVPA.22 Next, Part II.C looks at
the SVPA’s specific statutory language as well as the Illinois courts’
interpretation and approval of it.23 Lastly, Part II.D discusses statutory
definitions of other states’ sexual predator laws, in addition to clinical
definitions and common usage of key terminology that will be useful
while examining the language of the SVPA.24
.903 (“sexually violent predators”); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.14 (“Sexually Violent
Persons”); see also 53 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 16, § 125 (“A number of states have enacted
statutes relating to sexually dangerous persons, or persons with psychopathic personality
disorders, which are designed to cope with sex offenders who, because of a psychopathic
condition, commit or have a tendency to commit sex offenses.”); Landis, supra note 16, § 2
(explaining that statutes relating to sex offenders are designed to deal with problematic
individuals who have a tendency to commit sex offenses). Pennsylvania also refers to
certain individuals as “sexually violent predator[s].” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9792 (West
2007). However, the only involuntary commitment law that Pennsylvania has pertains
exclusively to children who are sexual predators. Id. § 6403; see also Heather R. Willis, Note,
Creeping by Moonlight: A Look at Civil Commitment Laws for Sexually Violent Predators Through
the Lens of the Yellow Wallpaper, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161, 172 n.100 (2008) (noting
that Pennsylvania aims its sexual predator legislation exclusively at young offenders).
Basically, sexually violent delinquent children can be involuntarily committed, but sexually
violent predators are only subject to registration. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6402–
6403, 9795.1(b)(3). While some of the definitions Pennsylvania uses are comparable to
other states’ sexual predator legislation, the Pennsylvania statute allowing civil
commitment will not be discussed further in this Note because it is has a substantially
different nature than other sexual predator legislation, that is, because it focuses only on
minors. Texas also has a law referring to “sexually violent predator[s].” TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.150 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). However, because it only
calls for outpatient treatment, not involuntary civil commitment, it will not be analyzed
further in this Note. See id. § 841.081(a) (calling for outpatient treatment and supervision
for those found to be sexually violent predators). There is also a federal law using the term
“sexually violent predator,” but it is only a registration law unrelated to civil commitment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1) (2006) (calling for the Attorney General to establish guidelines
for state sex offender registration programs).
20
See infra Part II (discussing the development of sexual predator legislation and key
terminology that allows civil commitment under these laws).
21
See infra Part II.A (describing the emergence of sexual predator legislation and its
development throughout the twentieth century).
22
See infra Part II.B (explaining the United States Supreme Court’s position on modern
sexual predator legislation).
23
See infra Part II.C (discussing the SVPA, its key terminology, and its acceptance by
Illinois courts).
24
See infra Part II.D (presenting definitions and interpretations of other key terminology
related to sexual predator legislation).
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A. The History of Sexual Predator Legislation
Sexual predator legislation, in some form or another, dates back to
the 1930s.25 The early versions of sexual predator laws, collectively
referred to as sexual psychopath laws, provided for involuntary civil
commitment of sexually violent individuals instead of incarceration.26
By the 1960s, a majority of the states and the District of Columbia had
sexual psychopath laws in some form.27 Most of these laws, however,
were repealed by the 1980s.28 The increased focus on civil rights resulted
in a backlash against sexual psychopath laws, as well as lingering
questions about the effectiveness of treatment programs.29
25
See John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of
Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996) (explaining that the 1930s
marked the decade when state legislatures first began introducing special procedures to
deal with individuals deemed to be sexually violent or dangerous); Adam D. Hirtz, Note,
Lock ‘Em Up and Throw Away the Key: Supreme Court Upholds Kansas’ Sexually Violent
Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 545, 545 (1998) (noting that the
mass media of the 1930s began publicizing particularly violent and brutal sexual attacks);
Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas:
A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 888 (1994) (discussing the fact that
Michigan passed the first sexual predator law in 1937); Willis, supra note 19, at 171
(explaining that some states have had sex offender civil commitment laws since the 1930s
and 1940s).
26
See Juliet M. Dupuy, Comment, The Evolution of Wisconsin’s Sexual Predator Law, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 873, 873 (1996) (noting that under early sexual psychopath laws,
commitments were preferred over imprisonment); McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 888 (stating
that Michigan adopted the first sexual psychopath law committing eligible individuals in
lieu of prison); Willis, supra note 19, at 171 (explaining that sexual psychopath laws viewed
commitment as an alternative to prison); Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as
States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
4144441 (noting that sexual psychopath laws in the early twentieth century were aimed at
individuals too sick for prison).
27
See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1297 (noting that more than half of the states and the
District of Columbia had some form of sexual predator legislation in place by 1960); Willis,
supra note 19, at 171 (stating that more than twenty-five states had sexual predator
legislation by the 1960s).
28
See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1297 (explaining that by the end of the 1980s, more than
half of the sexual predator laws which existed in the 1960s had been repealed or expired);
Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday: The Rise and Fall of Twentieth Century Sexual Psychopath
Laws, 69 LA. L. REV. 549, 549 (2008) (noting that sexual psychopath laws were the first batch
of laws aimed at sexually violent individuals but by 1990 most of these laws had been
overturned or fallen out of use); Davey & Goodnough, supra note 26 (stating that, by the
1980s, most sexual predator legislation had been repealed or stopped being used); see also
D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–3811 (West 2001) (allowing for the commitment of “sexual
psychopaths”).
29
See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1297 (“By the end of the 1980s, however, [the number of
sexual predator laws] had been cut in half, principally due to concerns about civil rights
and the apparent lack of success of sex offender treatment programs.”); Willis, supra note
19, at 171 (explaining that disfavor began to develop for sexual predator laws during the
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Shortly after this period of repeal, state legislatures reacted to certain
highly publicized cases by crafting the new versions of sexual predator
legislation that exist today.30 The state of Washington was the first to
adopt a modern sexual predator law, and it did so in reaction to a
particularly brutal case involving a sex offender.31 In May 1989, a sevenyear-old boy was riding his bike through a wooded nature trail when he
was approached by Earl Shriner.32 Shriner had recently completed a tenyear prison sentence for kidnapping and sexually assaulting two teenage
girls.33 Around dusk, a couple of hours later, a local family found the
boy naked and covered with mud and blood.34 The boy had been orally
and anally raped, stabbed, strangled, and castrated.35 Initially after the
attack, the boy was in shock, mumbling incoherently and unable to
speak.36 Once he regained the ability to speak, the boy identified
Shriner.37
Modern sexual predator laws, unlike many of the older statutes, are
aimed at sexually violent individuals who are nearing the end of their
prison term.38 While modern sexual predator laws are most often
1970s mainly due to the fact that individuals treated under them never seemed to be
cured).
30
See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1298 (noting that the 1990s have witnessed a rebirth of
sexual predator legislation); Lave, supra note 28, at 549 (explaining that modern sexual
predator laws are the second wave of sexual predator legislation); Willis, supra note 19, at
172 (stating that Washington was the first state to draft a modern sexual predator statute
and that it coined the popular phrase “sexually violent predator”); Davey & Goodnough,
supra note 26 (explaining that the state of Washington was the first to react, passing a
modern sexual predator law in 1990).
31
See infra notes 32–37 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Earl Shriner).
32
David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 525, 525−26 (1992).
33
Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1298.
34
Boerner, supra note 32, at 525.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. Shriner was charged with attempted first degree murder, first degree rape, and
first degree assault. Id.; see also Stacey Mulick, Ceremony to Remember 20th Anniversary of
NEWS
TRIBUNE
(Tacoma),
May
20,
2009,
“Little
Tacoma
Boy,”
THE
http://www.thenewstribune.com/2009/05/20/747814/ceremony-to-remember-20thanniversary.html. After being convicted, Shriner was sentenced to 131 years in prison. Id.
Sadly, the boy who was the victim of the crime died in a motorcycle accident in 2005. Id.
38
See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1298 (stating that the new generation of sexual predator
legislation focuses on those who have been tried, convicted, sentenced, and nearing the end
of their jail term); Eric S. Janus & Brad Bolin, An End-Game for Sexually Violent Predator Laws:
As-Applied Invalidation, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 25, 27 (2008) (explaining that sexual predator
laws use civil commitment to confine sexually violent individuals after the completion of a
prison term); Willis, supra note 19, at 172 (explaining that in Washington and most other
states with sexual predator legislation, a sexually violent individual only becomes eligible
for involuntary civil commitment upon the expiration of his or her prison sentence).
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invoked after imprisonment that stemmed from a criminal conviction, a
prior conviction is not necessarily required.39 The basic procedure for
commitment under these statutes usually requires the state to petition
the court for commitment as the suspected sexually violent individual
nears the end of a prison term.40 Typically, the state must prove that the
individual is sexually violent and thus eligible for commitment beyond a
reasonable doubt.41 If the state meets its burden and all constitutional
requirements are met, a court will commit the sexually violent individual
to treatment.42 The commitment is potentially indefinite with periodic
reviews to assess whether the individual is safe enough to be released. If
the individual is still dangerous, however, he or she remains confined.43
Sexual predator laws have two major goals: (1) to protect the public
from sexually violent individuals until those individuals are
rehabilitated and released, and (2) to subject sexually violent individuals
to treatment so the individual might be rehabilitated and return to
society.44 In pursuing these two goals, sexual predator legislation
provides “a secondary pathway for social control.”45
The civil
commitment called for in sexual predator laws allows the strict
standards and procedures of the criminal justice system to be

See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (West 2008) (allowing for the involuntary
civil commitment of those who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense,
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or found not guilty of a sexually
violent offense by reason of insanity); see also Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1300 (noting that
in certain circumstances, an individual may also be committed under some sexual predator
laws when there has been no adjudication or a finding of non-responsibility by reason of
mental disease or defect).
40
Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1300; see infra note 66 (giving a thorough explanation of the
SVPA’s procedures).
41
Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1300; see also infra note 66 (explaining the SVPA’s
procedural requirements).
42
E.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40 (stating that if the individual is found to be
sexually violent, the court must order the person committed for control, care, and
treatment); see infra Part II.B (discussing the constitutional requirement that modern sexual
predator laws must satisfy); infra note 66 (discussing the SVPA’s procedures).
43
See Willis, supra note 19, at 171 (explaining that commitment under sexual predator
legislation is potentially indefinite); Davey & Goodnough, supra note 26 (stating that
modern sexual predator laws allow for the potentially indefinite civil commitment of
certain individuals; however, under most laws, courts periodically review the cases of
those committed).
44
See 53 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 16, § 125 (2006) (explaining that the purpose of sexual
predator laws is to sequester sexually violent individuals from the public and to subject
sexually violent individuals to treatment); Landis, supra note 16, § 2 (stating that the social
objectives of sexual predator legislation are: (1) protecting society by containing sexually
violent individuals, and (2) treating sexually violent individuals so that they might recover
from their condition).
45
Janus & Bolin, supra note 38, at 27.
39
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inapplicable.46
As modern sexual predator laws have become
increasingly common, the Supreme Court has been forced to address the
constitutionality of this new breed of legislation.47
B. Establishing That Sexually Violent People Can Be Civilly Committed
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court established that states can
civilly commit sexually violent individuals so long as certain procedures
are followed.48 Hendricks involved a challenge to the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act.49 The State of Kansas appealed a Kansas Supreme
Id. at 27, 31–32.
See infra Part II.B (discussing the case law that found involuntary commitment of
sexually violent individuals constitutional).
48
See 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding that the Kansas law allowing for the civil
commitment of sexually violent predators did not violate due process, double jeopardy, or
ex post facto principles). The Hendricks decision actually built on preventive detention
principles laid out in Salerno. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987)
(explaining that due process is not offended when the government seeks to achieve the
legitimate and compelling regulatory goal of preventing future crime by detaining those it
sees as dangerous). At issue in Salerno was the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984. Id. at 741.
The Act allowed a judge to refuse bail and detain individuals before trial if the judge found
the individuals were dangerous to the community. Id. at 742. Respondents were arrested
on RICO violations and, pursuant to the Act, detained while awaiting trial. Id. at 743.
Respondents brought a due process challenge to the Act, first arguing that substantive due
process was violated because the pretrial detention was impermissible punishment before
trial. Id. at 746. The Court looked to legislative intent and found the Act to be aimed at
regulation, not punishment. Id. at 747. The Act did not violate substantive due process
because it was aimed at the legitimate regulatory goal of preventing danger to the
community. Id. In fact, the government interest in preventing future crime was both
legitimate and compelling. Id. at 749. The Court next disposed of the procedural due
process challenge, explaining that the Act provided numerous procedural safeguards built
into the detention determination. Id. at 751–52. Lastly, the Court rejected the respondents’
argument that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
752. The Court initially noted that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be
made available, but only serves to make sure bail is not excessive when made available. Id.
The Court then explained that when the government’s only interest is in preventing flight
by the defendant, bail must be tailored to an appropriate amount to ensure that goal and
no more. Id. at 754. However, when Congress has been clear that detention is based on an
interest other than preventing flight, as with the Act in question, the Eighth Amendment
does not require release on bail. Id. at 754–55.
49
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350. The Act established civil commitment procedures for those
persons found to be sexually violent predators. Id. A sexually violent predator was
defined in the Act as a person with “a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
makes the person likely to engage in . . . sexual violence.” Id. at 352. Kansas defined a
mental abnormality as a “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes the person” to sexual violence. Id. The Act required
notification to the local prosecutor sixty days before the anticipated release of a person who
might qualify for commitment under the Act. Id. Within forty-five days, the prosecutor
was then required to decide whether or not to file a petition seeking involuntary
commitment of the person. Id. If the petition was filed, the court had to decide whether
46
47
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Court ruling, which held that the Act violated substantive due process
rights.50 The United States Supreme Court held that substantive due
process was satisfied by a finding of future dangerousness, which was
then linked “to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality
disorder’ that [made] it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to
control his dangerous behavior.”51 Requiring a mental abnormality or
there was probable cause to believe the person was a sexually violent predator. Id. If
probable cause was found, the person was transferred for a mental evaluation. Id.
Eventually a trial was held where the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person was a sexually violent predator. Id. at 352–53. If this burden was
satisfied, the person was taken into custody by the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation
Services for control, care, and treatment. Id. at 353. The Act also had a number of
procedural safeguards, such as the assistance of counsel for indigent persons, examinations
by mental health professionals, the right to be present and cross-examine witnesses, the
opportunity to review evidence presented by the State, annual reviews to determine
whether continued detention was warranted, the possibility at any time for release if the
person’s condition had changed and the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services
believed release was appropriate, and the opportunity to petition the court at any time to
challenge whether the State could still satisfy its burden of proof. Id.
50
Id. at 356. In Hendricks, Hendricks was convicted of molesting two teenage boys. Id. at
353. Hendricks served nearly ten years in prison and was approaching release at the time
Kansas petitioned the court seeking Hendricks’s civil commitment pursuant to the Sexually
Violent Predator Act. Id. at 353–54. At a jury trial to determine if Hendricks was a sexually
violent predator, Hendricks’s own testimony revealed that he had engaged in numerous
acts of child molestation dating back to 1955. Id. at 354. Hendricks’s acts of child
molestation included the abuse of his own stepdaughter and stepson. Id. Furthermore,
Hendricks admitted that he repeatedly sexually abused children when not confined, and
that he molested children when he got stressed out. Id. at 355. A jury unanimously found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator. Id. Pursuant to
the Act, Hendricks was then civilly committed. Id. at 355–56. Hendricks appealed, and the
Kansas Supreme Court accepted his due process challenge. Id. at 356. The court explained
that in involuntary civil commitment proceedings, substantive due process requires the
state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and a
danger to himself or others. Id. The court then struck down the Act’s definition of “mental
abnormality” and found the Act to be a violation of substantive due process. Id. The court
did not address double jeopardy or ex post facto issues. Id.
51
Id. at 358. The Act at issue in Hendricks required a finding of dangerousness to one’s
self or others as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement. Id. at 357. Commitment was
only allowed under the Act after a person had been convicted of or charged with a sexually
violent offense, and that person had a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder”
which made the person likely to engage in predatory sexual violence. Id. “The statute thus
requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather, it requires evidence
of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of
such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.” Id. at 357−58. The Court
noted that a finding of dangerousness, standing alone, was not sufficient to justify
indefinite involuntary commitment. Id. at 358. Hendricks further argued that “mental
abnormality” was not equivalent to “mental illness” because the Kansas legislature, not
psychiatrists, created the term. Id. at 358–59. The Court rejected this argument because
psychiatrists themselves disagree over specific terminology and state legislatures have
never been required to adopt “particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment
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personality disorder before an individual can be committed caused the
number of persons who were eligible for commitment to decrease
compared to those who lack volitional control, that is, those who are
Furthermore, because civil
unable to control their behavior.52
commitment statutes aimed at sexually violent individuals are civil laws
rather than criminal laws, double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges
also failed.53
Just five years after Hendricks, the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act was again at issue in Kansas v. Crane.54 The Crane Court did not
overrule Hendricks, but instead sought to clarify its holding and elaborate
on the lack-of-volitional-control requirement when civilly committing
sexually violent individuals.55 The Crane Court held that while a
statutes.” Id. at 359; see Carolyn B. Ramsey, California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act: The
Role of Psychiatrists, Courts, and Medical Determinations in Confining Sex Offenders, 26
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 469, 476 (1998) (explaining that the Court’s disregard of any
distinction between a “mental abnormality” and a “mental illness” revealed a distrust of
medical science’s terminology in the law).
52
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358–60.
53
Id. at 361–71. As an initial matter, the Court looked to statutory construction; the
legislature’s placement of the Act in the probate code, not the criminal code, suggested that
the legislature viewed this as a civil law. Id. at 361. Additionally, the legislature described
the Act as creating civil commitment procedures. Id. The Court further reasoned that the
Act was civil in nature because it did not implicate either of the primary objectives of
criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. Id. at 361–62. The Act at issue in Hendricks
did not make criminal conviction a prerequisite for civil commitment; persons absolved of
criminal responsibility could qualify for commitment under the Act. Id. at 362. Since
criminal responsibility was not required, the State was not seeking retribution for past
misconduct. Id. Furthermore, no finding of scienter was required to qualify for
commitment under the Act. Id. Deterrence was also not an objective because persons who
qualify for commitment under the Act cannot exercise control over their behavior; thus, the
threat of confinement is unlikely to deter them. Id. at 362–63. Since the Act was civil in
nature, the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits being punished twice for the same
offense, was not offended. Id. at 369. “The Ex Post Facto Clause, which ‘forbids the
application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated,’” was also not
offended because it pertains exclusively to penal statutes. Id. at 370 (quoting Cal. Dep’t of
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995)). Furthermore, the Act makes an evaluation based
on current mental condition, not past conduct. Id. at 371. Past conduct is only used for
evidentiary purposes. Id. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the Act did not put an
emphasis on treatment. Id. at 396 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Without an emphasis on
treatment, the Act could not be considered civil; thus, the Act, through involuntary
commitment, amounted to punishment. Id.; see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
(explaining that a state’s punitive interest allows it to imprison criminals for the purposes
of deterrence and retribution); see also Janus & Bolin, supra note 38, at 25 (explaining that in
order to be constitutional, sexual predator laws must be regulatory or non-punitive).
54
See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002) (reconsidering the statute initially
addressed in Hendricks).
55
Id. at 411–12; see also People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 746 (Ill. 2003) (noting that
nothing in the Crane majority alters or overrules the principles announced in Hendricks).
The Kansas Supreme Court narrowly interpreted Hendricks as requiring the State to always
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complete or total lack-of-volitional-control finding is not necessary for
civil commitment, some lack-of-volitional-control determination must be
made.56 The Court reasoned that an absolutist approach that requires a
complete lack-of-volitional-control determination is unworkable.57
It is worth noting that the Kansas Supreme Court made a distinction
between “emotional capacity” and “volitional capacity” when

prove a complete inability to control behavior as a prerequisite to civilly commit a sexually
violent predator. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411. The State challenged this interpretation as being
too rigid. Id.
56
Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–13. The Court averred that most severely ill people, even those
considered psychopaths, have some ability to control their behavior. Id. at 412. Requiring
an absolute lack-of-volitional-control finding, therefore, “would risk barring the civil
commitment of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities.” Id.
However, the Constitution does not permit commitment without any lack-of-volitionalcontrol determination. Id. “[T]here must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling
behavior. And this . . . must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender
whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment
from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” Id. at
413. The Court recognized that this interpretation of Hendricks does not give a precise
constitutional standard in regards to civil commitment; however, the Court concluded by
noting that the Constitution’s human liberty protections in regards to mental illness and
the law are not best enforced through bright-line rules. Id.; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 81 (1985) (explaining that psychiatry is not an exact science and psychiatrists
oftentimes disagree on what constitutes mental illness).
57
Crane, 534 U.S. at 411. The additional requirement that the Court formulated, the lackof-volitional-control determination, was strongly criticized by the dissent. Id. at 422–23
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia voiced his disapproval by stating the following:
I not only disagree with the Court's gutting of our holding in
Hendricks; I also doubt the desirability, and indeed even the coherence,
of the new constitutional test which (on the basis of no analysis except
a misreading of Hendricks) it substitutes. Under our holding in
Hendricks, a jury in an SVPA commitment case would be required to
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) that the person previously
convicted of one of the enumerated sexual offenses is suffering from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder, and (2) that this condition
renders him likely to commit future acts of sexual violence. Both of
these findings are coherent, and (with the assistance of expert
testimony) well within the capacity of a normal jury. Today's opinion
says that the Constitution requires the addition of a third finding: (3)
that the subject suffers from an inability to control behavior—not utter
inability, and not even inability in a particular constant degree, but
rather inability in a degree that will vary “in light of such features of
the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of
the mental abnormality itself.”
This formulation of the new requirement certainly displays an
elegant subtlety of mind. Unfortunately, it gives trial courts, in future
cases under the many commitment statutes similar to Kansas's SVPA,
not a clue as to how they are supposed to charge the jury!
Id. (citations omitted).
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interpreting a mental abnormality and had its analysis struck down.58
The Crane Court, however, did not hold that “emotional capacity” and
“volitional capacity” are the same for the purposes of civil
commitment.59 On the contrary, the Court did not even consider the
“emotional capacity” language because the “volitional capacity” inquiry
was enough to uphold the Act.60 In fact, neither the Hendricks nor Crane
Courts considered what exactly the “emotional capacity” language, so
often found in sexual predator legislation, means.61 Having looked at the
key decisions establishing sexual predator laws as constitutional, the
SVPA and its specific language can now be discussed.62
C. The Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act
States use varying terminology to label the class of individuals
regulated by their sexual predator laws.63 Illinois refers to these
58
See id. at 415 (majority opinion) (vacating the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment
which interpreted the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); infra note 86 (explaining that
the Kansas Supreme Court believed “emotional” and “volitional” actually referred to
separate capacities).
59
See Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–13 (holding that while a complete or total lack-of-volitionalcontrol finding is not necessary for civil commitment, some lack-of-volitional-control
determination must be made).
60
See id. at 413 (explaining that, in order to civilly commit someone under the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act, there must be proof that the individual has serious difficulty
in controlling his or her behavior). However, the Court further explained that its decision
did not address whether civil commitment based solely on a mental abnormality involving
the “emotional capacity” would be constitutional. Id. at 415.
61
See id. (noting that the “emotional capacity” language was not considered in Hendricks,
nor is it considered in the present case). The Crane Court further explained that
[r]egardless, Hendricks must be read in context. The Court did not
draw a clear distinction between the purely “emotional” sexually
related mental abnormality and the “volitional.” Here, as in other
areas of psychiatry, there may be “considerable overlap between
a . . . defective understanding or appreciation and . . . [an] ability to
control . . . behavior.” Nor, when considering civil commitment, have
we ordinarily distinguished for constitutional purposes among
volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments. The Court in
Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether confinement based
solely on “emotional” abnormality would be constitutional, and we
likewise have no occasion to do so in the present case.
Id. (citations omitted).
62
See infra Part II.C (discussing the enactment, key terminology, and judicial approval of
the SVPA).
63
See supra note 19 (elaborating on the varying terminology states use to describe a sex
offender subject to civil commitment; this terminology includes phrases such as: sexual
psychopath, sexually violent person, sexually violent predator, sexually dangerous person,
person with a sexual psychopathic personality, dangerous sex offender, sex offender
requiring civil commitment or supervision, and sexually dangerous individual).
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individuals as sexually violent persons, and they are regulated by the
SVPA.64 The SVPA became effective on January 1, 1998.65 The SVPA
permits the commitment of sexually violent individuals provided that
the state follows certain procedures.66 The SVPA can best be understood
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008). Closely related to the SVPA is
another Illinois law entitled the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (“SDPA”). Id. at
205/1.01–12. The SDPA can be applied to individuals who have never faced a trial for a
sex offense. People v. Winterhalter, 730 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). The SDPA
can be applied to individuals so long as the state can convince the trier of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person has criminal propensities to the commission of sex
offenses. People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 743 (Ill. 2003). The SVPA, however, only
applies to individuals who have “been convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or found not
guilty by reason of insanity, of a sexually violent offense.” Winterhalter, 730 N.E.2d at 1162.
Also “[u]nlike the SVPA, the SDPA does not specifically address the probability or
likelihood that the subject of the proceeding will engage in sexual offenses in the future.”
Masterson, 798 N.E.2d at 743; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (using a
“substantially probable” standard). This Note will focus on the SVPA for two major
reasons: (1) the SVPA is most similar to sex offender civil commitment laws in other
jurisdictions, thus allowing for better comparisons, and (2) this Note is a critique of existing
statutory language, not language that is yet to be written or which has been purposefully
omitted. The SVPA also relieves some of the strain already felt on underfunded Illinois
prisons. See, e.g., Monique Garcia, Quinn to Release 1,000 Inmates from Prison in Cost-Cutting
Move, CHI. TRIB., (Sept. 18, 2009, 5:38 PM), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/
2009/09/quinn-to-release-1000-inmates-from-prison-in-costcuttingmove.html?utm_source
=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+chicagotribune%2Fcloutstre
et+(Chicago+Tribune%3A+Clout+Street) (discussing a recent attempt at saving money in
Illinois by releasing prisoners early and laying off prison workers); Josh Stockinger, Future
Uncertain for Aging St. Charles Youth Prison, DAILY HERALD (Chi.), Nov. 29, 2009,
http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=340307 (discussing the funding issues in Illinois
prisons).
65
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, Pub. Act 90-40 (1997) (codified as
amended at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008)).
66
See generally 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (stating all of the procedures and
requirements necessary for commitment as an SVP). Under the SVPA, the State’s Attorney
in the appropriate county is given written notification of the suspected SVP’s release date
from incarceration. Id. at 207/9. Notification is to be given at least six months prior to the
anticipated release date by the Illinois Department of Corrections or the Department of
Juvenile Justice; the notification explains that the person will be considered for
commitment under the SVPA. Id. Three months prior to the person’s release or discharge,
if the person is found to be subject to commitment, the appropriate agency shall inform the
State’s Attorney and the Attorney General of the person’s name, offense history, mental
condition, treatment, and numerous other pieces of information. Id. at 207/10(b)–(c).
Based on the report, the Attorney General, at the request of the agency with jurisdiction,
the applicable State’s Attorney, or both working jointly, may then file a petition with the
circuit court alleging that the person is an SVP. Id. at 207/15(a)(1)–(3). The petition has to
be filed not more than ninety days before the person’s anticipated release. Id. at 207/15(b6). The proceedings under the SVPA are civil in nature. Id. at 207/20. Upon filing of the
petition, the court reviews the petition to determine if there is probable cause that the
person is an SVP. Id. at 207/30(a). If probable cause is found, the person is taken into
custody and transferred to an appropriate facility for an evaluation. Id. at 207/30(c). If
probable cause is not found, the petition is dismissed. Id. No later than 120 days after the
64
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by looking at its key terminology and the approval of this terminology in
light of Hendricks and Crane.67
1.

The SVPA’s Key Terminology and Definitions

The SVPA defines a sexually violent person as a person who suffers
from a mental disorder that makes the person substantially probable to
engage in sexual violence.68 Thus, the meaning of the term “sexually

probable cause hearing is held, a trial is conducted to determine if the person is an SVP. Id.
at 207/35(a). Upon request, the trial may be by a jury; otherwise, it is a bench trial. Id. at
207/35(c). The petitioner, that is, the state, has the burden of proving the allegations in the
petition beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 207/35(d)(1). If the court or jury determines
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is an SVP, the person shall be committed. Id. at
207/35(f). If the court or jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, the petition is
dismissed and the person is released. Id. The terms of the commitment are decided by the
court, and these terms can be for either institutional care at a secure facility or conditional
release. Id. at 207/40(b)(1)–(2). If institutional care at a secure facility is ordered, the
Department of Human Services places the SVP at a facility provided by the Department of
Corrections. Id. at 207/50(a). The Department of Human Services must submit a written
report to the court within six months of the initial commitment, and at least once every
twelve months thereafter. Id. at 207/55(a). The report is on the SVP’s mental condition and
whether the SVP has made enough progress to be conditionally released or discharged. Id.
An SVP who has been institutionalized for care at a secure facility may petition the court
for conditional release. Id. at 207/60(a). The petition can be filed if at least six months have
passed since the initial commitment, the denial of the most recent release petition, or the
revocation of the most recent order for conditional release. Id. The director of the facility
where the SVP is being treated may petition for conditional release at any time. Id. An SVP
may also petition the court for a complete discharge. Id. at 207/65(b)(1). Furthermore, if
the Secretary of Human Services determines at any time that the SVP is no longer sexually
violent, the Secretary of Human Services shall authorize a petition for discharge. Id. at
207/65(a)(1). The State’s Attorney or Attorney General, whoever filed the original petition,
shall represent the state in challenging the SVP’s petition for conditional release or
discharge. Id. at 207/60(b), 207/65(a)(2). In response to petitions for conditional release or
discharge, the state has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
SVP is still sexually violent. Id. at 207/60(d), 207/65(a)(2). If the state fails to meet its
burden of proof, the person shall be released. Id. at 207/65(a)(3). See generally In re Det. of
Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 618–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (discussing the procedures of the
SVPA and the discretion of the trial court in SVP determinations). There is currently a
proposed amendment that would give authority to the Department of Healthcare and
Family Services, rather than the Department of Human Services. See H.R. 5303, 2009 Leg.,
96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010).
67
See infra Part II.C.1 (looking at the SVPA’s statutory language); infra Part II.C.2
(discussing the SVPA’s treatment, as well as approval, by the Illinois Supreme Court).
68
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f). The precise definition offered in the SVPA is that
a sexually violent person is
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has
been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been
found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and
who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder
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violent person” depends on the meanings of “mental disorder” and
“substantially probable.”69 The term “mental disorder” is defined as a
condition affecting the “emotional or volitional capacity” that
predisposes an individual to sexual violence.70 The Illinois Supreme
Court has refused to rely solely on medical science when interpreting the
definition of mental disorder.71
The SVPA does not provide a definition of “substantially
probable.”72 As a result, Illinois courts have been forced to interpret
what this means.73 Through such analysis, courts defined “substantially
probable” as meaning “much more likely than not.”74 While crafting a
definition of “substantially probable,” Illinois courts have made it clear
that the definition cannot be broken down into a mathematical

that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts
of sexual violence.
Id. When originally passed, the definition provided that a sexually violent person could
have “been found not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of
insanity, mental disease or mental defect.” Pub. Act 90-40 (1997). The current definition,
however, was drafted eight months after the SVPA went into effect. Pub. Act 90-793 (1998).
69
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f).
70
Id. at 207/5(b). The SVPA fully defines a mental disorder as “a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage
in acts of sexual violence.” Id.
71
See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining why the mental health community’s definition of a
mental disorder is not the determining factor in SVPA civil commitments).
72
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5 (omitting a definition of “substantially
probable”).
73
See In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 452–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (discussing what
“substantially probable” means and how it compares to the standard upheld in Hendricks);
In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1155–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (assessing what
“substantially probable” means in light of its interpretation by courts in other states); In re
Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (discussing what “substantially
probable” means and whether it can be broken down into a mathematical formula).
74
See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (defining “substantially probable” as meaning “much
more likely than not”); Bailey, 740 N.E.2d at 1156–57 (explaining that “substantially
probable” means “much more likely than not,” a definition already formulated and
accepted in Wisconsin). In Bailey, the court relied on a Wisconsin case, In re Commitment of
Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 2000), in defining the term “substantially probable.” Bailey,
740 N.E.2d at 1156. The Curiel court equated the term “substantial probability” to
substantially probable, finding no difference between the two terms. Id. “Substantially”
means considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent; furthermore, the term
“much” can commonly convey the same meaning as “substantially.” Id. “Probable” can be
defined as having “more evidence for than against.” Id. Since dictionary meanings can be
looked to in the absence of a statutory definition, the Bailey court concluded that
“substantially probable” is defined as “much more likely than not.” Id. at 1157.
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standard.75 The specific language and definitions discussed above
provide the framework for the SVPA’s constitutional analysis.76
2.

The SVPA’s Approval After Hendricks and Crane

In 2001, the SVPA was challenged in light of Hendricks.77 The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the SVPA, reasoning that the SVPA, much like
the Kansas law found constitutional in Hendricks, requires a finding of a
mental disorder that affects an individual’s ability to control his or her
behavior.78 The major focus in the SVPA is whether an individual can
control his or her sexually violent acts.79 The two terms used in defining
a mental disorder, “emotional” and “volitional,” are adjectives ensuring
that those meant to be covered by the statute are included under its
language.80 After meeting constitutional scrutiny initially, the SVPA was
again challenged after the Crane decision.81 The Illinois Supreme Court,

75
See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (stating that “substantially probable” cannot be broken
down into percentages); Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 1002 (rejecting the idea that “substantially
probable” can be reduced to a percentage).
76
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the SVPA’s approval in light of Hendricks and Crane).
77
In re Det. of Varner, 759 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. 2001). Varner involved a substantive due
process challenge to the SVPA based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hendricks. Id. The
petitioner’s argument was that his commitment under the SVPA could not be reconciled
“with the principles of substantive due process because it occurred without a specific
finding by the jury that he lacked volitional control over his sexually violent criminal
behavior.” Id. The petitioner further claimed that his commitment was only constitutional
if he lacked volitional control over his sexually violent conduct. Id.
78
Id. at 564. The jury’s determination that petitioner was an SVP necessarily required a
finding that he suffered from a mental disorder. Id. The pre-commitment finding of a
mental disorder, appropriately defined in the SVPA, was sufficient to “narrow[] the class of
persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.”
Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)).
79
Id. at 565.
80
Id. The Varner court further explained that
the terms “emotional” and “volitional” are merely adjectives used to
describe the reasons an individual might lack the capacity to control
his behavior. Medical science’s understanding of mental pathology is
imperfect and evolving, and the legislature used these terms simply to
insure that everyone who is unable to control his or her sexually
violent behavior is covered by the law, whatever the precise reason for
that lack of control might be.
Id.
81
In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 796–97 (Ill. 2003). The case involved the same
petitioner and the same substantive due process challenge as the earlier Varner decision,
759 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. 2001). Id. at 795. However, the United States Supreme Court vacated
the earlier decision and remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for further
consideration in light of Crane. Id.
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relying heavily on its previous opinion, once again upheld the SVPA.82
The court rejected the petitioner’s claim that Crane required a specific
lack-of-volitional-control determination.83 So long as the SVPA contains
specific definitions that encompass the constitutional elements of civil
commitment, substantive due process is satisfied.84
The Illinois Supreme Court decisions after Hendricks and Crane
elaborated on the “mental disorder” language and rejected the position
that “emotional” and “volitional” refer to separate capacities.85 The
Kansas Supreme Court, in its interpretation of a “mental abnormality,”
believed that the two words “emotional” and “volitional” actually
referred to separate capacities.86 In assessing the “emotional or volitional
82
Id. at 799; see also In re Det. of Isbell, 777 N.E.2d 994, 998–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (giving
a thorough discussion of the SVPA’s Varner approval in light of Crane).
83
Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 798. The Court reasoned that, because the Crane Court upheld
the commitment in Hendricks, Crane does not require a specific determination by the fact
finder in every case that a person cannot control his or her behavior. Id. The Court went
on to further state the following:
As we recently observed in Masterson: “Clearly the justices of the
Crane majority did not believe their decision called into question the
continued viability of Hendricks. Nothing said in the majority opinion
explicitly repudiates or alters principles espoused in Hendricks.” We
acknowledge that Masterson involved the constitutionality of a
commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.
Nevertheless, our decision included a thorough analysis of the Act at
issue in this case, i.e., the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act . . . . For this reason, our analysis of the Act in Masterson provides
substantial guidance in this case.
In Masterson, we noted that several state courts have held that
their sexually violent offender statutes conformed to Hendricks and
Crane where those statutes, like our Act, require proof of the
commission of a prior offense, and include specific definitions of
“mental abnormality” or “mental disorder,” as well as a defined
burden regarding the likelihood of future offenses. Those statutes, as
with our Act, contain definitions that supply the constitutionally
required elements for civil commitment. A fact finder properly
instructed with definitions of these and other pertinent statutory terms
need not receive additional separate instruction on lack of control.
Id. at 798–99 (citations omitted); see also People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 748 (Ill. 2003)
(looking to the SVPA to shape the ,ourt’s analysis of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
because the two statutes are “governed by one spirit and a single policy”).
84
See Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 798–99 (explaining that substantive due process is satisfied
with carefully crafted definitions).
85
See infra notes 86–88 (discussing the Kansas Supreme Court’s view that “emotional”
and “volitional” refer to separate capacities and why Illinois has rejected this).
86
Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 797. The Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of “emotional
or volitional capacity” was twofold: (1) by including the term “volitional,” the legislature
was addressing a condition which prevented an individual from controlling his or her
behavior; and (2) by including “emotional,” the Court believed the legislature must have
intended to include an additional circumstance unrelated to an inability to control one’s
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capacity” language, however, Illinois has rejected this distinction and
emphasized that the most important element is whether the person is
able to control his or her behavior.87 The Illinois Supreme Court has
taken the position that the Illinois legislature, in drafting the SVPA,
simply wanted to make its language as inclusive as possible.88 While the
above-mentioned Illinois Supreme Court decisions provide substantial
guidance on the SVPA’s interpretation, it is also useful to look at and
compare the language offered in similar sexual predator laws and other
authorities.89
D. Language and Key Definitions in Other Jurisdictions
Illinois is not the only state that has a sexual predator law.90 Indeed,
the SVPA is shaped by the same overarching principles that guide all
sexual predator legislation.91 To fully understand the SVPA’s language,
it is helpful to look at definitions offered in similar laws as well as other
authorities.92 The definitions offered by other states’ sexual predator
laws are discussed below, followed by the language of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) and common
dictionary definitions.93

behavior. Id. Through this interpretation, the Kansas court did not believe the statute met
the Hendricks standard of only applying to persons who cannot control their dangerous
behavior. Id.
87
See id. (reasoning that the Illinois legislature did not use the terms “emotional” and
“volitional” as a way to differentiate between individuals who can control their sexually
violent behavior and those who cannot). The terms “emotional” and “volitional” merely
describe the reasons someone might be unable to control his or her behavior. Id.
88
See id. (rejecting the Kansas interpretation of “emotional or volitional capacity” and
reasoning that the Illinois legislature simply wanted to ensure that everyone who is unable
to control his or her sexually violent behavior is covered by the SVPA); supra note 87
(discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s explanation of why “emotional” and “volitional”
do not refer to separate capacities).
89
See infra Part II.D (discussing the language of other jurisdictions’ sexual predator laws
and other definitions of key terminology).
90
See supra note 18 (listing the states that have sexual predator laws).
91
See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text (discussing the guiding principles and
goals of sexual predator legislation).
92
E.g., In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 796–99 (Ill. 2003) (comparing the SVPA to the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); see also In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1155–57
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (looking to a Wisconsin law and dictionary definitions in order to
interpret what “substantially probable” meant).
93
See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the statutory language that states other than Illinois
use in their sexual predator laws); infra Part II.D.2 (looking at numerous other definitions
found in medical diagnostic manuals and dictionaries).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 4

570
1.

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

The Language Found in Other Sexual Predator Laws

The SVPA uses the terms “mental disorder” and “substantially
probable” to compose its sexually violent person definition.94 Thus,
someone is an SVP if he or she has a mental disorder that makes him or
her substantially probable to engage in sexual violence.95 The structure
of the SVPA’s sexually violent person definition mirrors other states’
definitions; however, there are variations among the terms used.96 In
regard to the SVPA’s mental disorder language, a few states, like Illinois,
Most states, however, use a
use the term “mental disorder.”97
combination of “mental abnormality” and “personality disorder.”98 In
regard to the SVPA’s “substantially probable” language, most states

See supra note 68 (explaining how Illinois defines an SVP).
See supra note 68 (illustrating that the two terms mental disorder and substantially
probable define an SVP under the SVPA).
96
See infra notes 97–100 (discussing the definitions that other states use in their sexual
predator laws and comparing the most common terminology found in those definitions).
97
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7)(b) (2009) (using the term “mental disorder” in
defining a sexually violent person); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 1998 &
Supp. 2009) (using the term “mental disorder” in defining a sexually violent predator); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (West Supp. 2008) (using the term “mental disorder” to define a
sexually violent person).
98
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10)(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2009) (using the phrase
“mental abnormality or personality disorder” to define a sexually violent predator); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 229A.2(11) (West Supp. 2009) (using the term “mental abnormality” to define
a sexually violent predator); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2008) (defining a
sexually violent predator as someone with a “mental abnormality or personality disorder”);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (using the terms “mental
abnormality” and “personality disorder” in the definition of a sexually dangerous person);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006) (using the term “mental abnormality” to define a
sexually violent predator); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01(1) (2008) (referring to dangerous sex
offenders as individuals with a “mental illness” or “personality disorder”); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 135-E:2(XII)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (using the phrase “mental abnormality or
personality disorder” to define a sexually violent predator); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26
(West 2008) (defining a sexually violent predator as someone with a “mental abnormality
or personality disorder”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009)
(stating that a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement is someone who suffers from
a “mental abnormality”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1)(b) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (using the
phrase “mental abnormality or personality disorder” to define a sexually violent predator);
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2005 & Supp. 2009) (requiring a “mental abnormality” or
“personality disorder” to be considered a sexually violent predator); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) (defining a sexually violent predator as
someone with a “mental abnormality or personality disorder”); see also N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 25-03.3-01(8) (2002) (stating that a sexually dangerous individual is someone with a
“personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction”).
94
95
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choose to apply the “likely” standard.99 However, Missouri is unique
because it uses a “more likely than not” standard.100
In many circumstances, the sexual predator laws in other
jurisdictions also provide definitions of key terminology.101 For instance,
many sexual predator laws define a “mental abnormality” or “mental
disorder,” whichever term is used, as a mental condition that affects the
emotional or volitional capacity of a person and predisposes that person
to sexual violence.102 While most states use “emotional or volitional
99
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7)(b) (using “likely” as the standard in defining a
sexually violent person); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (stating that a sexually
violent predator is someone “likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior”);
D.C. CODE § 22-3803(1) (West 2001) (explaining that a sexual psychopath is someone
“likely” to attack others); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10)(b) (defining a sexually violent
predator as someone “likely” to engage in sexual violence); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(11)
(finding a sexually violent predator to be someone who is “likely” to engage in sexual
violence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (defining a sexually violent predator as someone
“likely” to engage in sexual violence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 1 (stating that a
sexually dangerous person is someone “likely” to attack or inflict injury because of
uncontrollable desires); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01(1) (defining a dangerous sex offender
as someone “likely” to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 135-E:2(XII)(b) (stating that a sexually violent predator is someone who is “likely” to be
sexually violent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (defining a sexually violent predator as
someone “likely” to engage in sexual violence); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (stating
that a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement is someone “likely” to be a danger to
others and commit sex offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (explaining that a
sexually dangerous individual is someone “likely” to engage in sexually predatory
conduct); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1)(b) (finding a sexually violent predator to be
someone who is “likely” to engage in sexual violence); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (defining
a sexually violent predator as someone “likely” to engage in sexual violence); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (stating that a sexually violent predator is someone who is
“likely” to be sexually violent); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (defining a sexually violent
person as someone “likely” to engage in one or more acts of sexual violence).
100
See MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (defining a sexually violent predator as “any person
who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to
engage in . . . sexual violence”).
101
See infra notes 102–05 (discussing the definitions that some states provide for key
terms in their sexual predator laws).
102
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(c) (defining a diagnosed mental disorder as a
congenital or acquired condition that affects the “emotional or volitional capacity” of an
individual and predisposes that person to sexual violence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(5)
(stating that a mental abnormality is a mental condition affecting an individual’s
“emotional or volitional capacity” that predisposes that individual to sexual violence);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(5) (explaining that a mental abnormality is a condition affecting
the “emotional or volitional capacity” of a person and predisposing that person to sexually
violent acts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (defining a mental abnormality as a congenital
or acquired condition that affects the “emotional or volitional capacity” of an individual in
a manner which predisposes that person to sexual violence); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(2)
(explaining that a mental abnormality is a condition that affects the “emotional or volitional
capacity” of an individual which predisposes that person to sexually violent acts); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(VII) (noting that a mental abnormality is a mental condition
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capacity” in their definitions, “cognitive” is also used occasionally.103
Some states also define what it means to be “likely” to commit sexually
violent acts.104 For example, the “likely” standard has been defined as
meaning more likely than not.105 While statutory definitions offer courts
affecting an individual’s “emotional or volitional capacity” in such a manner that it
predisposes that person to sexual violence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(3) (stating that a
mental abnormality is a mental condition that affects an individual’s “emotional or
volitional capacity” which predisposes that individual to sexual violence); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37.2-900 (defining both mental abnormality and personality disorder as conditions
affecting a person’s “emotional or volitional capacity” that make the person likely to be
sexually violent); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(8) (explaining that a mental
abnormality is a condition affecting an individual’s “emotional or volitional capacity” that
predisposes the individual to sexual violence); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (defining a
mental disorder as a condition that affects the “emotional or volitional capacity” of an
individual in such a manner that it predisposes the individual to sexual violence). With the
exception of Virginia and Washington, the states that use “personality disorder” in their
sexual predator laws do not define it. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912 (including no
definition of “personality disorder”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (omitting a definition of
“personality disorder”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (leaving out a statutory definition
of “personality disorder”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (including no definition of
“personality disorder”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (omitting a definition of “personality
disorder”); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (including a definition of “personality
disorder” within a definition of “mental abnormality”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.020(9) (defining “personality disorder”). For the purposes of this Note, it makes no
difference because the Illinois law does not use the term “personality disorder.” Likewise,
the Illinois sexual violent predator law omits any reference to a personality disorder. See
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5 (West 2008). When defining a mental disorder or mental
abnormality, the “emotional or volitional capacity” language is standard in sexual predator
laws because the Kansas sexual predator law that was twice upheld by the United States
Supreme Court contains “emotional or volitional capacity” in its definition of a mental
abnormality. See supra Part II.B (discussing Hendricks and Crane, cases which upheld the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act).
103
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (using the phrase “emotional, cognitive or volitional
capacity” in defining a mental abnormality); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(i) (stating that
a mental abnormality can affect the “emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a
person”).
104
See infra note 105 (discussing the definitions that some states provide for the “likely”
standard in their sexual predator laws).
105
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(4) (defining “[l]ikely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence” as meaning that a person more likely than not will be sexually violent);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7) (stating that “[l]ikely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility” means the person more probably than
not will be sexually violent if released from detention); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(1m)
(defining “likely” as “more likely than not”). Although not the standard, Wisconsin
defines “substantially probable” as “much more likely than not.” Id. § 980.01(9). An
alternative definition to the “likely” standard that some states use is that “likely” means the
individual’s propensity towards sexual violence is of such a degree that the individual is a
threat to the health and safety of others. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(4) (stating that
“[l]ikely to engage in acts of sexual violence” means the individual’s propensities towards
sexual violence are such that the individual is a menace to the health and safety of others);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(c) (defining “[l]ikely to engage in repeat acts of sexual
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the most guidance for analyzing sexual predator laws, it is also useful to
look at the definitions found in mental health manuals and dictionaries
in order to fully understand key terminology.106
2.

The DSM and Other Key Definitions

The DSM is a diagnostic tool designed to aid those in the mental
health community in identifying and treating mental conditions,
disorders, and abnormalities.107 The DSM explains that a mental
disorder is conceptualized as a behavioral or psychological syndrome or
pattern that is associated with distress, disability, or a significantly
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or loss of freedom.108
The syndrome or pattern cannot merely be an expected and socially
The DSM qualifies its
accepted response to a certain event.109

violence” as meaning the person’s propensities towards sexually violent acts are of such a
degree that the person is a menace to the health and safety of others); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83174.01(2) (saying that “[l]ikely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence” means a person’s
propensity to commit sex offenses is of such a degree that he is a menace to the health and
safety of others); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(VI) (explaining that “[l]ikely to engage in
acts of sexual violence” means that the person’s propensity to commit sexually violent acts
is of such a degree that the person has serious difficulty controlling behavior and is a
danger to others); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (stating that “[l]ikely to engage in acts of
sexual violence” means the individual’s propensities towards sexually violent acts are of
such a degree that the individual is a threat to the health and safety of others); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-48-30(9) (defining “[l]ikely to engage in acts of sexual violence” as meaning the
person’s propensities towards sexual violence are of such a degree that the person is a
menace to others’ health and safety).
106
See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the language of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders as well as common dictionary definitions).
107
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS xxiii–xxiv (4th ed., Text Revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM]; see Cornwell, supra
note 25, at 1321 (explaining that the DSM is a diagnostic system used to aid clinicians in
identifying and treating mental health impairments). The most recent edition of the DSM
is referred to as the DSM-IV because it is the fourth edition of the manual. John Cloud,
Redefining Crazy:
Researchers Revise the DSM, TIME (March 11, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1884092,00.html.
The DSM-IV was
originally published in 1994. Id. The fifth edition, to be referred to as the DSM-V, is set for
publication in 2012. Id.
108
DSM, supra note 107, at xxxi. The full conceptualization of a mental disorder is a
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern
that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress
(e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more
important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of
suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.
Id.
109
Id. The DSM refers to the death of a loved one as an example of an event which gives
rise to an expected and socially accepted response. Id. The DSM goes on to further explain
the following:
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conceptualization by noting that there is an inherent difficulty in
defining the term “mental disorder” because there is much of the
physical in mental disorders and vice versa; thus, the term “mental
disorder” implies a distinction where oftentimes a distinction does not
exist.110 Additionally, the DSM acknowledges that the term “mental
disorder” lacks a consistent operational definition.111
Despite its focus on diagnosing mental disorders, the United States
Supreme Court has explained that medical science, and therefore the
DSM, does not play a role in whether sexually violent individuals can be
civilly committed.112 In fact, the Hendricks Court acknowledged that
legislatures typically have the responsibility of defining medical terms
with legal significance.113 However, given the fact that experts often look
to the DSM for guidance when making SVPA civil commitment
determinations, its language and concepts are helpful for analysis
purposes.114

Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered a
manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction
in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or
sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and
society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a
symptom of a dysfunction in the individual.
Id.
Id. at xxx.
Id.
112
See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (explaining psychiatry informs but does
not control legal determinations); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358–59 (1997)
(rejecting the idea that psychiatrists and the medical community must agree on certain
terminology and concepts before civilly committing sexually violent individuals). The
Hendricks Court was faced with an argument that the term “mental abnormality,” which
the Kansas legislature used in the Sexually Violent Predator Act, was not a valid term for
the purposes of civil commitment. Id. at 358–59. Hendricks argued that “mental illness”
needed to be used instead because it was accepted by the psychiatric community. Id. The
Court rejected this, reasoning that courts and the medical community have disagreed
frequently on what constitutes mental illness and that a variety of terms have been used to
describe individuals subject to civil commitment. Id. at 359. Furthermore, the Court
upheld the Kansas Act despite no reference to the DSM in any of the statutory definitions.
Id. at 360; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2008) (making no reference to the
DSM in any of the statutory definitions).
113
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
114
See People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 740–41 (Ill. 2003) (discussing the SDPA,
closely related to the SVPA, and involving a court determination based on an expert’s DSM
diagnosis and the respondent’s past sexual misconduct that the respondent was sexually
dangerous); In re Det. of Lieberman, 884 N.E.2d 160, 176–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (involving
state experts who used the DSM for their evaluations, but did not base their diagnosis
solely on the DSM’s criteria).
110
111

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/4

Brennan: Keeping the Dangerous Behind Bars: Redefining What a Sexually Vio

2011]

Redefining Sexually Violent Person in Illinois

575

It is also helpful to consider dictionary definitions when trying to
ascertain the meaning of statutory language.115 “Substantially” means
ample or considerable in amount or quantity.116 “Substantially” is also
defined as real in worth or value.117 “Probable” means having “more
evidence for than against.”118 Due to their prominence in the SVPA’s
construction and interpretation, “emotional” and “volitional” are also
worth defining.119 “Emotional” is defined as prone to emotion, with
“emotion” being defined as “a state of feeling.”120 “Volitional” refers to
the ability to make a choice or determination.121
Dictionary definitions are useful for interpreting some of the
statutory language found in modern sexual predator laws.122 Courts
only look to dictionaries, however, when the statutory language leaves
The mental health community offers a
gaps to be filled.123
conceptualization of one of the key terms, mental disorder, but
acknowledges that a precise definition is difficult to compose.124 These
authorities, along with judicial interpretations and comparable laws in

115
E.g., In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1157 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (explaining that
when a statute does not define a term, courts may look to dictionary definitions in order to
derive the term’s plain and ordinary meaning).
116
WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1126 (2005) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S II NEW
COLLEGE].
117
Id.
118
Bailey, 740 N.E.2d at 1156 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990)).
Another offered definition for “probable” is “evidence that inclines the mind to belief but
leaves some room for doubt.” WEBSTER’S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE DICTIONARY 629–30 (1997);
see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 989 (11th ed. 2003) [hereinafter
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S] (defining “probable” as “supported by evidence strong enough to
establish presumption but not proof” as well as “likely to be or become true or real”).
119
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (West 2008) (using the phrase “emotional or
volitional capacity” in defining mental disorder).
120
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 118, at 408. “Emotional incapacity” can be defined
for legal purposes as the “inability to control one’s emotions or express appropriate
emotions because of a mental disorder.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter BLACK’S].
121
BLACK’S, supra note 120, at 1710. An additional definition of “volition” describes it as
“the power of choosing” and makes a cross-reference to “will.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra
note 118, at 1401.
122
See supra notes 117–21 (discussing the common usage definitions found in
dictionaries).
123
See In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (analyzing the
dictionary meaning of “substantially probable” in order to apply the standard absent a
statutory definition).
124
See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text (offering a conceptualization of mental
disorder, but also explaining the difficulties in precisely defining the term).
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other jurisdictions, help establish a foundation for analyzing the precise
language in the SVPA.125
III. ANALYSIS
The SVPA and the language it uses are constitutional.126 This
language defines a sexually violent person as an individual who suffers
from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the
individual will commit sexual violence.127 Although the SVPA survives
constitutional scrutiny, it does not automatically mean that the SVPA is
perfectly constructed.128 Controversy surrounds the two terms used to
define a sexually violent person: mental disorder and substantially
probable.129 Because these two terms are capable of taking away an
individual’s freedom indefinitely, an extended analysis is worthwhile.130
This Part first analyzes the meaning of the SVPA’s mental disorder
language.131 Specifically, it addresses certain language used in the
mental disorder definition as well as medical science’s role in defining a
mental disorder.132 Next, this Part turns to the substantially probable
standard used in the SVPA.133 It analyzes this standard in comparison to
the constitutionally approved “likely” standard, and also addresses the

125
See infra Part III (analyzing the SVPA’s terminology in light of statutory language,
judicial interpretation, and various other authorities).
126
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the SVPA’s approval in light of both Hendricks and
Crane).
127
See supra note 68 (discussing the SVPA’s definition of a sexually violent person).
128
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the problems posed by the mental disorder language of
the SVPA); infra Part III.B (analyzing the problematic “substantially probable” standard the
SVPA employs).
129
See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill. 2003) (analyzing the mental disorder
language of the SVPA); In re Det. of Isbell, 777 N.E.2d 994, 998–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(addressing a challenge to the mental disorder definition used in the SVPA); In re Det. of
Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (addressing the respondent’s argument that
“substantially probable” can be reduced to mathematical terms); In re Det. of Bailey, 740
N.E.2d 1146, 1155–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (involving an argument that “substantially
probable” is unconstitutionally vague); In re Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2000) (discussing whether or not “substantially probable” is definable in percentages).
130
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the mental disorder definition and interpretation in the
SVPA); infra Part III.B (analyzing the “substantially probable” standard used in the SVPA).
131
See infra Part III.A (discussing the interpretation of the mental disorder language in
the SVPA).
132
See infra Part III.A.1 (critiquing the interpretation of the “emotional or volitional
capacity” language in the SVPA’s mental disorder definition); infra Part III.A.2 (explaining
why the DSM cannot be wholly determinative when it comes to assessing whether an
individual has a mental disorder).
133
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the “substantially probable” standard that the SVPA
uses).
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argument that “substantially probable” can be reduced to a specific
percentage.134
A. Mental Disorder and Its Meaning in the SVPA
The SVPA defines the term “mental disorder” as a condition
affecting the “emotional or volitional capacity” that predisposes a person
to sexual violence.135 Courts have accepted this definition despite its
reference to an unknown “emotional capacity” and despite the fact that
it does not rely on the medical science community’s understanding of
what constitutes a mental disorder.136 This Part addresses those issues in
turn.137 Part III.A.1 discusses the key inquiry under the SVPA and
critiques how that inquiry ignores certain statutory language.138 Part
III.A.2 then explains how the refusal to mix medical and legal
terminology when defining a mental disorder is actually one of the
SVPA’s strengths.139
1.

The Key Inquiry and How “Emotional Capacity” Has Been Ignored

The Illinois Supreme Court has rejected the idea that “emotional”
and “volitional” refer to separate capacities. Instead, the court has taken
the position that the Illinois legislature simply wanted to make its
language as inclusive as possible.140 The view that “emotional” and
“volitional” do not refer to separate capacities is problematic for the
SVPA.141 As an initial matter, the current interpretation of “emotional or
volitional capacity” does not give accord to the plain and ordinary
134
See infra Part III.B.1 (comparing “substantially probable” to the “likely” standard
upheld in Hendricks); infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing whether “substantially probable” can be
defined in mathematical terms).
135
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (West 2008); see also supra note 70 (giving the
SVPA’s full definition of mental disorder).
136
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (omitting any reference to the DSM when
defining a mental disorder); infra notes 140–50 (discussing the interpretation of “emotional
capacity” and how it has not yet been determined to what that capacity refers).
137
See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the “emotional capacity” language and how it has
been ignored); infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the reasons for not relying on medical science
when defining “mental defects” in the law).
138
See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the “volitional capacity” language and explaining how
it has dominated the statutory interpretation of a mental disorder under the SVPA).
139
See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing why the DSM cannot provide the SVPA’s mental
disorder definition).
140
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Varner position that the Illinois legislature did not
use the terms “emotional” and “volitional” as a way to differentiate between individuals
who are capable of controlling their sexually violent behavior and those who are not).
141
See infra notes 142–52 and accompanying text (explaining why “emotional” and
“volitional” should be interpreted as separate capacities).
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meaning of the language.142 Legislatures choose specific terminology for
a reason and each term is supposed to be given equal weight.143 Illinois
courts, however, have rendered the “emotional capacity” language
meaningless by including it in the “volitional capacity” inquiry.144
While Illinois courts have acknowledged that the “inability to
control sexually violent behavior is a sine qua non” under the SVPA, they
have overlooked the fact that this indispensible condition is completely
covered by the “volitional capacity” language.145 “Volitional capacity,”
when interpreted according to its plain dictionary definition, means the
capacity to choose or act according to one’s will.146 When substituted
into the definition of mental disorder, this interpretation covers the key
inquiry under the SVPA: whether an individual can control his or her
sexually violent acts.147 Thus, Illinois courts have rendered “emotional

142
See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill. 2003) (taking the position that the
Illinois legislature did not intend emotional or volitional capacity to refer to separate
capacities, thereby rendering the emotional capacity language meaningless and focusing on
the lack-of-control determination).
143
See In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1156–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (acknowledging
that the best evidence of a legislature’s intent is the language itself, and that statutory
language must interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning). See generally In re
Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (explaining that statutes must be
interpreted so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent and to avoid constitutional
difficulties and inconvenience).
144
See Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 797 (concluding that “emotional capacity” is just an
additional term used in assessing whether an individual can control his or her sexually
violent behavior).
145
See id. (explaining that the key condition which must be present to civilly commit
pursuant to the SVPA is an inability to control sexually violent acts); supra note 121 and
accompanying text (defining volitional as the ability to make a choice or determination); see
also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002) (explaining that Hendricks, the case
establishing that sexually violent individuals could be civilly committed, limited its
discussion to volitional disabilities).
146
See supra note 121 (giving a definition of “volitional” as the ability to choose or act
according to one’s will).
147
See supra note 79–80 and accompanying text (discussing the major inquiry when
civilly committing individuals pursuant to the SVPA). When the dictionary definition of
“volitional capacity” is substituted into the SVPA’s mental disorder language, the
definition of a mental disorder becomes the following: a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the capacity to choose or act according to one’s will, which predisposes a person
to engage in sexual violence. See supra note 70 (discussing the actual statutory definition of
a mental disorder). This definition, which completely disregards any “emotional capacity”
language, almost mirrors the current interpretation of the SVPA’s mental disorder
definition, which actually includes the term “emotional capacity.” See Varner, 800 N.E.2d at
797 (discussing the “emotional capacity” and “volitional capacity” language in light of the
SVPA’s key inquiry).
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capacity” ambiguous and meaningless through their current
interpretation.148
An additional problem with drawing no distinction between
“emotional” and “volitional” capacities is that it actually serves to limit
the SVPA’s application.149 It is well recognized by the judiciary that
medical science terms are constantly changing.150 Illinois courts have
prevented themselves from applying “emotional capacity” to an
additional mental health condition, which may not have even been
articulated yet, by taking the position that “emotional” and “volitional”
refer to the same capacity. The “volitional” language clearly covers the
main inquiry: whether an individual can control his or her behavior.151
Thus, Illinois could have relied on the “volitional capacity” in making its
Crane and Hendricks analyses, while reserving the “emotional capacity”
for a future mental health condition.152 This would have not only left the
Illinois courts some flexibility but also reserved a separate capacity that
could be applied to SVPs in the future.
As illustrated above, the precise language used helps determine
whether or not someone qualifies for commitment under the SVPA.153
The mental disorder language is particularly important because it
encompasses the primary inquiry for purposes of civil commitment.154
Although the presence of a mental disorder plays a prominent role in
determining whether someone will be committed pursuant to the SVPA,
the case law clearly states that the mental health community’s language
is not controlling when determining if someone has a mental disorder.155

148
See supra notes 142–47 (explaining that the Illinois interpretation of mental disorder
has rendered the “emotional capacity” language in the mental disorder definition
meaningless).
149
See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (explaining that Illinois’s interpretation
of mental disorder actually limits the SVPA’s applicability to sexually violent individuals).
150
See, e.g., Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (explaining that the field of mental health is continually
advancing); Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 797 (noting that medical science’s understanding of
mental conditions is constantly evolving).
151
See supra note 147 (explaining that the main inquiry under the SVPA is covered by the
“volitional capacity” language in the statutory definition of a mental disorder).
152
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s view of the SVPA in light
of both Hendricks and Crane).
153
See supra notes 135–52 and accompanying text (illustrating the importance of the
language used in the SVPA).
154
See supra notes 140–47 (discussing the primary inquiry under the SVPA).
155
See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the reasons why medical terminology is not
controlling in the context of the SVPA).
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The DSM and Why It Does Not Play a Role in SVPA Civil
Commitments

Illinois has correctly taken the position that medical science
terminology is not controlling in the context of SVPA civil
commitments.156 The DSM cannot be relied on in committing SVPs
because important distinctions exist between clinical and legal
viewpoints on mental abnormalities, disorders, and diseases.157 A
clinical diagnosis under the DSM, standing alone, does not translate into
a specified legal standard.158 In fact, the DSM acknowledges that simply
diagnosing a mental disorder does not necessarily imply that an
individual can or cannot control behaviors associated with the
disorder.159 Given that the SVPA currently requires a lack-of-volitionalcontrol over sexually violent behavior, the DSM simply acts as a brick in

156
See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill. 2003) (explaining that because medical
science’s understanding of mental health is constantly evolving, the Illinois legislature used
the terms “emotional” and “volitional” in the mental disorder definition “simply to insure
that everyone who is unable to control his or her sexually violent behavior is covered by
the [SVPA]”); In re Det. of Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). The
respondent
cites to no authority in which a court has found that due process is
violated when a person is committed under a sexually violent person
statute based upon a mental disorder that is not specifically listed in
the DSM. Indeed, the [SVPA] does not require that there be a
consensus among mental health professionals regarding a diagnosis or
that the diagnosis be listed specifically in the DSM in order for that
particular diagnosis to support a sexually violent person finding.
Id.
157
Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1320–21. Legal definitions of mental abnormalities are not
based exclusively on therapy and treatment. Id. at 1321. Legal definitions must take into
account other concerns, such as moral responsibility, safety, and due process. Id.
“[A]ttempting to graft one system completely onto the other” cannot be done. Id.
Furthermore, the DSM has gone through numerous revisions and versions, adding certain
conditions and subtracting others; were the DSM relied on to commit sexually violent
individuals, someone may be considered sexually violent one day and found safe the next.
Id. at 1321–22; see also DSM, supra note 107, at xxiii (explaining that the DSM is intended to
be a helpful tool for practicing mental health professionals; furthermore, the DSM is aimed
at clinicians and relies on extensive empirical data).
158
See DSM, supra note 107, at xxxiii. There is an imperfect fit between questions of law
and questions of clinical diagnosis. Id. Typically, the clinical diagnosis of a mental
disorder is not enough to establish a mental disorder, disease, or defect for the purposes of
the law. Id. The diagnosis of a legal standard related to mental health, for example
competence or criminal responsibility, usually requires additional information beyond that
which is required to make a clinical diagnosis. Id.
159
See id. (“[T]he fact that an individual’s presentation meets the criteria for a DSM-IV
diagnosis does not carry any necessary implication regarding the individual’s degree of
control over the behaviors that may be associated with the disorder.”).
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the wall of evidence required to commit an SVP.160 Accordingly, the
SVPA’s current use of the DSM as a helpful guide, but not a controlling
factor, is one of the SVPA’s strengths.161 While useful for diagnostic
purposes, the DSM is not mentioned in the SVPA’s definition of a mental
disorder.162 The Illinois legislature, nonetheless, saw fit to draft a
The SVPA, however, does not define
definition of the term.163
“substantially probable,” leaving Illinois courts to fill in the gaps that the
legislature left behind.164
B. The “Substantially Probable” Standard and the Role of Math in Civil
Commitment
The “substantially probable” language serves as the standard of
whether an individual can be civilly committed within the SVPA’s
definition of a sexually violent person.165 Given the lack of a statutory
definition, Illinois courts have been forced to interpret and define what
“substantially probable” means.166 Through such analysis, courts have
defined “substantially probable” to mean “much more likely than
not.”167 Part III.B.1 compares the substantially probable standard to the
“likely” standard that was upheld in Hendricks and Crane, and it explains
160
See People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 740–41 (Ill. 2003) (dealing with the SDPA,
closely related to the SVPA, and involving a determination by the court based on an
expert’s DSM diagnosis and the respondent’s past sexual misconduct that the respondent
was a sexually dangerous person); In re Det. of Lieberman, 884 N.E.2d 160, 176–77 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007) (involving state experts who used the DSM for some of their evaluations but did
not base their recommendation solely on the DSM diagnosis). In Masterson, the sexually
dangerous person determination was actually reversed and remanded in order to ensure
compliance with the newly announced Crane standard; however, the evidence at the initial
commitment hearing was sufficient to comply with the Hendricks standard. Masterson, 798
N.E.2d at 749; see also DSM, supra note 107, at xxxiii (noting that the DSM is probably best
reserved in the legal context for assisting decision makers in their determinations).
161
See supra notes 157–60 (explaining why the DSM is incompatible with the SVPA’s
standards and language).
162
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (West 2008) (omitting any reference to the
DSM when defining a mental disorder).
163
See id. (defining mental disorder).
164
See id. at 207/5 (failing to define “substantially probable” despite using it to define a
sexually violent person); infra Part III.B (analyzing the judicial interpretation of the SVPA’s
“substantially probable” language).
165
See id. at 207/5(f) (explaining that in order to be an SVP, and thus subject to
commitment under the SVPA, an individual must have “a mental disorder that makes it
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence”).
166
See supra notes 72–75 (discussing the statutory construction surrounding the
“substantially probable” language and how “substantially probable” has been defined and
interpreted).
167
See supra note 74 (explaining that Illinois courts have found “substantially probable”
to mean “much more likely than not”).
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that the SVPA’s standard is needlessly high.168 Finally, Part III.B.2
explains that Illinois courts have correctly refused to assign a specific
number to the “substantially probable” standard.169
1.

“Substantially Probable” as a Needlessly High Standard

The substantially probable standard that the SVPA uses is
problematic for Illinois because it is needlessly higher than the standard
approved in Hendricks and Crane.170 The Kansas law upheld in both
Hendricks and Crane stated that a person could be civilly committed if
that person was “likely” to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.171
The SVPA does not use “likely” as the standard but instead opts for
substantially probable.172 Illinois courts have found that substantially
probable is higher than or equal to the standard upheld in Hendricks and
Crane, and they base their decision on the meaning of substantially
probable, which is defined as “much more likely than not.”173
By looking at the plain construction of the phrases, it would appear
that the SVPA’s standard of “substantially probable” is clearly higher
than the “likely” standard approved in Hendricks and Crane.174 Whereas
the Hendricks and Crane standard is “likely,” the SVPA standard adds
“much more” and “than not” to the standard.175 The Kansas law at issue
168
See infra Part III.B.1 (comparing the “substantially probable” standard to the “likely”
standard and arguing that the “substantially probable” standard is higher than is
constitutionally required).
169
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing whether “substantially probable” can be reduced to a
specific percentage).
170
See supra Part II.B (discussing Hendricks and Crane, United States Supreme Court cases
that upheld a Kansas sexual predator law that allows for civil commitment of an individual
who is “likely” to engage in sexual violence); infra notes 171–84 (illustrating that the
SVPA’s substantially probable standard is higher than the “likely” standard found
constitutionally permissible in Hendricks and Crane).
171
See supra note 49 (explaining the standards at issue with the Kansas sexual predator
law and when civil commitment was allowed under it); supra note 99 (noting that the
Kansas law, like many other sexual predator laws, uses a “likely” standard); see also In re
Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 796–99 (Ill. 2003) (offering a thorough discussion of the
Hendricks and Crane decisions).
172
See supra note 68 (giving the definition of sexually violent person, which states that an
individual may be civilly committed if he is substantially probable to be sexually violent).
173
See In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (explaining that the
definition of “substantially probable” as “much more likely than not” satisfies the
standards set forth in Hendricks).
174
See infra notes 175–79 (analyzing the respective standards and discussing how
“substantially probable” has been interpreted as a higher standard than “likely”).
175
See supra note 74 (discussing the Illinois definition of “substantially probable”); supra
note 49 (explaining that the Kansas law allows a sexually violent predator to be committed
if he is “likely” to be sexually violent); supra note 99 (stating that the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act uses a “likely” standard).
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in Hendricks and Crane offers a definition of “[l]ikely to engage in repeat
acts of sexual violence,” but it does not offer a clear definition of the
“likely” term in particular.176 Meanwhile other states, modeling their
statutory language and “likely” standard on the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act, clearly define “likely” as meaning “more likely than
not.”177 Thus, the SVPA standard of substantially probable adds the
word “much” and thereby requires a higher probability of sexual
violence than the “likely” standard approved in Hendricks.178
Accordingly, fact finders in civil commitment cases under the SVPA
must be convinced the individual is much more, not just more, likely
than not to be sexually violent.179
The concept that “substantially probable” is a higher standard than
“likely” is further supported by looking at dictionary definitions, which
is what Illinois courts did when they formulated their definition of
substantially probable.180 “Substantially” means considerable in amount,
value, or quantity.181 “Probable” can be defined as having more
evidence for than against.182 When combined, a “substantially probable”
standard based solely on dictionary definitions would require having

See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02(c) (2005 & Supp. 2009) (defining “likely” as
“mean[ing] the person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as
to pose a menace to the health and safety of others”); supra note 105 (explaining the Kansas
sexual predator law).
177
See supra note 105 (noting that Iowa and Wisconsin have defined “likely” as meaning
“more likely than not,” while Washington has defined “likely” as “more probably than
not”). In fact, Missouri actually uses the language “more likely than not” in its definition of
a “sexually violent predator;” by doing so, it subtracts the step of using a “likely” standard
and defining that term separately. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006) (explaining
that a sexually violent predator is an individual who is “more likely than not” to engage in
sexual violence).
178
Compare supra note 74 (discussing the judicially established definition of “substantially
probable,” which is defined as “much more likely than not”), with supra note 100
(explaining that Missouri uses the language “more likely than not” in its sexually violent
predator definition, thereby cutting out the added step of using a “likely” standard and
defining it separately), and supra note 105 (discussing the states which define the “likely”
standard as meaning “more likely than not”).
179
See supra note 178 (comparing the various standards used and looking at the
additional language in the “substantially probable” definition, which serves to raise its
standard when compared to “likely”).
180
See In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1156–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (looking to a
Wisconsin interpretation of “substantially probable,” which relied on dictionary definitions
in formulating its definition); infra notes 181–83 and accompanying text (analyzing what
“substantially probable” means in light of dictionary definitions).
181
See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text (discussing the various dictionary
definitions of “substantially”).
182
See supra note 118 (discussing the definition or “probable”).
176
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considerably more evidence for than against.183 When compared to the
“likely” definition of “more likely than not,” the dictionary definition of
“substantially probable” clearly requires a higher likelihood of sexual
violence.184
The higher standard that the SVPA uses poses problems for Illinois
and its enforcement of the SVPA. By employing a higher standard than
is necessary, the SVPA needlessly limits itself. A lower standard has
been constitutionally accepted, but the SVPA does not employ that
standard.185 Thus, the SVPA does not reach individuals who are civilly
committed pursuant to sexual predator laws in other states. The higher
standard found in the SVPA allows sexually violent individuals to go
free in Illinois while those same individuals might be subject to
potentially indefinite civil commitment in other states.
Due to the lack of a statutory definition, Illinois courts were forced to
define “substantially probable”; they concluded that it means “much
more likely than not.”186 However, questions can still surround statutory
language and subject it to challenge even with judicially created
definitions in place.187 An additional issue related to the “substantially
probable” standard is whether or not it can be reduced to a percentage.188
2.

“Substantially Probable” and Why It Cannot Be Reduced to a
Number

Illinois courts have defined “substantially probable” as meaning
“much more likely than not.”189 Illinois courts, however, have refused to

183
See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text (defining what “substantially” and
“probable” mean).
184
Compare supra note 105 (explaining that “likely” has been defined as meaning “more
likely than not”), with supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing what a
“substantially probable” definition would look like based solely on dictionary meanings).
185
See supra Part II.B (discussing the constitutional standards that due process requires in
regards to civil commitment); supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the SVPA and the language it
uses).
186
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5 (West 2008) (omitting a definition of
“substantially probable”).
187
See In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (analyzing and rejecting
an argument that Hendricks established a mathematical standard for due process to be
satisfied); In re Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (involving an
argument by the respondent that “substantially probable” could be reduced a
mathematical formula).
188
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing whether “substantially probable” can be reduced to a
mathematical formula).
189
See supra note 74 (discussing the Illinois courts’ definition of “substantially probable”
as “much more likely than not”).
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assign a specific number to the definition of “substantially probable.”190
Despite the fact that Hendricks upheld a “likely” standard, definable as
“more likely than not,” Illinois has not found that a particular
mathematical standard satisfies due process.191 The judiciary’s refusal to
assign a specific number to “substantially probable” is one of the SVPA’s
strengths.192
Although experts are sometimes willing to testify that a potential
SVP has a specific percentage chance of engaging in sexual violence,
there is no reason for the Illinois courts to handcuff enforcement of the
SVPA by assigning a specific number to one of the SVPA’s key
inquiries.193 Requiring that “substantially probable” be defined in
mathematical terms would ask for precision in an imprecise field.194
Even the Crane Court acknowledged that mathematical precision is not
always possible when it comes to lack-of-control determinations.195
Additionally, experts called who give such mathematical probabilities
would oftentimes disagree about whether an individual even has a
mental disorder, as well as what percent chance that the individual will
commit another offense if a mental disorder is found.196 Lastly, given the
190
See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Hendricks did not
establish a mathematical standard which allows for the commitment of SVPs); Walker, 731
N.E.2d at 1002 (rejecting the idea that “substantially probable” under the SVPA can be
reduced to a percentage).
191
See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (rejecting the idea that Hendricks established a due process
standard in mathematical terms). The Hayes court elaborated on the idea of a mathematical
standard by stating that
[r]espondent argues that under Hendricks a person may be committed
as a sexually violent person only if she or he is more likely than not to
commit an act of sexual violence in the future. Recast in mathematical
terms, respondent’s argument requires a probability of reoffense
greater than .5 or 50%. We do not believe that the Supreme Court
identified a mathematical standard when it held that the “likely”
standard used in the Kansas legislation complied with due process.
The question of substantial probability under the Act cannot be
reduced to mere percentages.
Id. (citing Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 994).
192
See infra notes 193–97 and accompanying text (discussing why the reduction of
“substantially probable” to a mathematical formula would only serve to limit the SVPA
and restrict its application to SVPs).
193
See Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 1002 (mentioning that the respondent offered two expert
opinions, each of which gave a specific percent chance of the respondent reoffending over
the next ten years); supra Part II.B (discussing the Kansas sexual predator law that was
found to be constitutional despite using only a “likely” standard).
194
See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) (stating that psychiatry is not an exact
science).
195
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
196
E.g., Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 1002 (involving experts who disagreed over the alleged
SVP’s recidivism rate, one expert placing the chance of reoffending at thirty-seven percent
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Supreme Court’s omission of any mathematical formula or specific
numerical requirement in order to civilly commit sexually violent
individuals, requiring that experts predict a certain percent chance of
reoffending before commitment would only serve to limit enforcement
of the SVPA.197
Having looked at the SVPA’s sexually violent person definition,
certain strengths and weaknesses are present.198 While the SVPA does
not make the mistake of relying solely on the DSM for its mental
disorder determinations, certain key language is ignored by the courts.199
The “substantially probable” language, while not reducible to a
mathematical formula, limits the SVPA’s applicability through a
needlessly high standard.200 Although currently constitutional, the
SVPA could broaden its applicability to reach more potential SVPs while
retaining its constitutionality through some careful adjustments to the
statutory language.201
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The meaning of the term “sexually violent person” turns on what the
terms “mental disorder” and “substantially probable” mean.202 Courts
have only focused on mental disorders based on “volitional capacity”

while the other found this chance to be only twenty-two percent); see also Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (noting that psychiatrists oftentimes disagree on what
constitutes a mental illness); In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(stating that the fields of psychiatry and psychology are riddled with disagreement over
what constitutes a mental disorder).
197
See Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–15 (discussing the requirements for constitutional civil
commitment, but not establishing a precise mathematical standard); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
356–71 (omitting discussion of any specific mathematical requirement in order to civilly
commit a sexually violent individual); In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (noting that the United States Supreme Court did not establish a mathematical
standard while twice upholding the “likely” standard in the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act).
198
See supra Part III (analyzing the SVPA’s sexually violent person definition while
focusing on the mental disorder and substantially probable language).
199
See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the language currently being ignored in the SVPA’s
mental disorder definition); supra Part III.A.2 (discussing why the DSM is not a good fit in
the context of the law).
200
See supra Part III.B.1 (stating that “substantially probable” is actually a higher
standard than the “likely” standard approved by the United States Supreme Court); supra
Part III.B.2 (discussing why “substantially probable” cannot be reduced to a specific
percentage).
201
See infra Part IV (discussing the improvements that can be made to the SVPA’s
language which will increase its applicability to potential SVPs while maintaining its
constitutionality).
202
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (West 2008) (defining sexually violent person).
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when determining whether to civilly commit SVPs.203 Additionally, the
“substantially probable” standard is actually higher than what was
approved in Hendricks and Crane.204 This Part first proposes that
“emotional capacity” be given meaning separate from “volitional
capacity.”205 This Part then suggests that the Illinois legislature change
the SVPA’s language and lower the “substantially probable” standard to
“likely.”206
A. Making “Emotional Capacity” Mean Something
Illinois should be creative with the Hendricks and Crane opinions and
give meaning to the SVPA’s “emotional capacity” language.207 If the
“emotional capacity” language is given meaning, more SVPs could be
covered under the SVPA and the community would be safer.208 Given
the fact that “emotional incapacity” can be defined as the inability to
control emotions, it follows that “emotional capacity” means the ability
to control one’s emotions.209 Emotion refers to a state of feeling.210
Illinois should take these definitions and apply them to SVPA civil
commitments.211
One approach is to argue that someone is an SVP if he feels there is
nothing wrong with his inappropriate urges or behaviors. Thus, if
someone feels that sexual acts with children are acceptable behaviors
and he has no control over that feeling, that person would qualify as an
SVP. This preemptive approach would look at how an individual feels,
hopefully, before a sexually violent act takes place. Another option is to
allege that someone is an SVP if he is unable to control the way he feels
after a sexual assault. If, for example, an individual feels no remorse and
has no control over his inability to feel remorse, that individual would
qualify as an SVP.

203
See supra Part III.A.1 (critiquing how the SVPA’s “emotional capacity” language has
been ignored).
204
See supra Part III.B.1 (comparing “substantially probable” to “likely” in the context of
sexual predator legislation).
205
See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that “emotional capacity” be given meaning).
206
See infra Part IV.B (explaining why the SVPA should utilize a “likely” standard instead
of “substantially probable”).
207
See infra notes 208–11 and accompanying text (explaining why Illinois should give
meaning to the “emotional capacity” language found in the SVPA).
208
See infra notes 209–11 and accompanying text (offering a meaning for the “emotional
capacity” language contained in the SVPA).
209
See supra note 120 (giving the definition of “emotional incapacity”).
210
See supra text accompanying note 120 (defining “emotional”).
211
See infra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining how “emotional capacity” could
be given meaning).
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Under either approach to the new interpretation, the individual feels
he is doing or has done nothing wrong. Obviously there will be some
overlap. If, for example, an alleged SVP is getting out of prison for
sexually assaulting a minor, the state could argue that the individual felt
his past act was not wrong and continues to feel that future acts of sexual
violence would not be wrong. If the individual has no control over these
feelings, he would qualify as an SVP.
This new interpretation would open the doors to civil commitments
of a new class of SVPs: individuals unable to control how they feel.
Persons eligible for commitment under the SVPA would no longer be
limited only to those unable to control how they behave.212 Thus, it
would broaden the SVPA’s reach and keep more dangerous people off
the streets. This broader interpretation of the SVPA, however, would
likely spark a constitutional challenge. The United States Supreme Court
has yet to decide a sexual predator case involving commitment based
solely on an individual’s emotional capacity.213 Even if challenged, this
new interpretation by Illinois could withstand constitutional scrutiny.214
As an initial matter, the civil nature of the statute would not
change.215 Retribution, one of the principal aims of criminal punishment,
would not be accomplished.216 Even by giving “emotional capacity”
meaning, the SVPA would still not require criminal responsibility. As a
result, Illinois would not be seeking retribution for past misconduct.217
Deterrence, another goal of criminal punishment, would also not be
accomplished.218 A person newly determined to be an SVP based on his
emotional capacity would be unable to control how he feels, and it is

212
See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text (demonstrating that a new type of SVP
would emerge if the Illinois courts would interpret “emotional capacity” and “volitional
capacity” as separate capacities).
213
See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (stating that neither the Hendricks nor
Crane opinions considered whether a civil commitment pursuant to a sexual predator law
based solely on an individual’s emotional capacity was constitutional).
214
See infra notes 215–25 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the new
interpretation of the SVPA could withstand constitutional scrutiny).
215
See infra notes 216–19 (illustrating that the SVPA would remain a civil statute even if
“emotional capacity” were given meaning).
216
See supra note 53 (explaining that the Hendricks opinion focused on retribution as one
of the primary purposes of criminal punishment).
217
See supra note 53 (noting that according to Hendricks, the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act did not require criminal responsibility, thus it was not seeking retribution for
past misdeeds); supra note 68 (giving the SVPA’s definition of a sexually violent person and
showing that a prior criminal conviction is not required for commitment).
218
See supra note 53 (summarizing the Hendricks position that deterrence joins retribution
as one of the two primary aims of criminal punishment).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/4

Brennan: Keeping the Dangerous Behind Bars: Redefining What a Sexually Vio

2011]

Redefining Sexually Violent Person in Illinois

589

difficult to deter someone who has no control.219 In addition, double
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges would fail because the SVPA
would remain civil in nature.220 All of the procedures of the SVPA
would stay the same, so procedural due process would also be
satisfied.221
A substantive due process challenge would have more merit but
would also fail.222 The class of individuals covered by the SVPA would
remain sufficiently narrow to satisfy Hendricks.223 The class would
consist of individuals with a mental disorder that makes those
individuals unable to control how they feel before or after a sexually
violent act. This mental disorder would have to be such that the
individual is substantially probable to be sexually violent. The Crane
opinion looked at a commitment based on the volitional capacity and
decided that there must be an inability to control behavior.224 Under the
new interpretation of the SVPA, with a commitment based on the
emotional capacity, an inability to control feelings would be required.
Thus, the Crane concern over some type of lack-of-control determination
would be satisfied.225
The Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the SVPA’s language
would be problematic for this new type of SVP but could also be

See supra note 53 (restating the Hendricks reasoning that individuals without control
are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement).
220
See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing the Hendricks analysis of double
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act).
According to the Hendricks Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause only applies to criminal
punishment and the ex post facto clause pertains exclusively to penal statutes. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997).
221
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008) (stating the procedures of the
SVPA); see also supra note 66 (summarizing the procedural requirements of the SVPA);
supra Part II.C.2 (offering history of the SVPA’s approval in light of constitutional
challenges).
222
See infra notes 223–25 (stating why the new interpretation of the SVPA’s language
would satisfy substantive due process).
223
See supra notes 51−52 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court in Hendricks
viewed the language in the Kansas law as constitutional because it narrowed the class of
persons eligible for commitment to those who lacked volitional control).
224
See supra note 56 (discussing the Crane conclusion that there must be some
determination that the alleged sexually violent individual has serious difficulty controlling
behavior); supra notes 60–61 (stating that neither Hendricks nor Crane discussed the
significance of emotional capacity but were instead concerned with commitments based on
an individual’s volitional capacity).
225
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the Crane requirement of a lackof-control determination).
219
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overcome.226 In Varner, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the Illinois
legislature did not intend for “emotional” and “volitional” to
differentiate between those capable of controlling sexually violent
behavior and those not capable of controlling sexually violent
behavior.227 This interpretation of the SVPA could easily be overcome by
a legislative statement saying otherwise. The Illinois legislature could
simply amend the SVPA to include some clarification that emotional and
volitional do, in fact, refer to separate capacities. It also could broaden
the SVPA’s applicability by giving meaning to the “emotional capacity”
language that it chose to write. Although a new interpretation of
existing language is one way to broaden the SVPA’s applicability, a
slight change of the commitment standard is another way the SVPA
could reach more dangerous individuals.228
B. Lowering the “Substantially Probable” Standard
The Illinois legislature should lower the “substantially probable”
standard to the “likely” standard upheld in Hendricks and Crane.229 The
adjusted version of the SVPA should define a sexually violent person as
follows:
A person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually
violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a
sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage
in acts of sexual violence.230

226
See infra notes 227–28 and accompanying text (illustrating how the Varner
determination that “emotional” capacity and “volitional” capacity both refer to the same
capacity can be overcome by the Illinois legislature).
227
See supra note 86 (noting that the Varner court did not believe that emotional and
volitional referred to separate capacities); supra note 88 (analyzing the Illinois Supreme
Court’s opinion that the Illinois legislature did not use the terms “emotional” and
“volitional” as a way of differentiating between those capable of controlling behavior and
those not capable of controlling behavior).
228
See infra Part IV.B (suggesting the “substantially probable” standard be lowered to
“likely”).
229
See supra Part II.B (discussing Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane, the two United
States Supreme Court cases establishing the constitutionality of modern sexual predator
laws); supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the “likely” standard that was upheld in both Hendricks
and Crane).
230
See supra note 68 (giving the SVPA’s definition of a sexually violent person). The
italicized language is the Notewriter’s original contribution.
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The constitutional requirements can be satisfied by using a “likely”
standard. The SVPA calls for an unnecessarily high standard by opting
to use “substantially probable” in its definition of a sexually violent
person.231 Thus, the SVPA limits itself because it uses a higher standard
than is required. If the “likely” standard is used instead of the
“substantially probable” standard, then more SVPs could be found and
committed.
An obvious challenge to this change is that Illinois should not lower
its standard but instead should leave the “substantially probable”
language in place to protect the civil liberties of alleged SVPs. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has ruled that using a “likely”
standard is enough to protect civil liberties.232 Thus, changing the
standard would, according to our highest court, not infringe on
constitutionally protected civil liberties. If Illinois insists on being a
champion of civil liberties, it can do so in areas of law that do not involve
potential life-altering tragedies. For example, prisoners could be given
voting rights or a public speaking forum. A child should not be raped
and murdered simply because Illinois wants to have the sexual predator
law most friendly to civil liberty.
Those against changing the standard could also argue that Illinois
should not simply fall in line with other states and that it should instead
be given a right to experiment. After all, the beauty of the federalist
system is that different sovereigns can draft laws as they choose. Public
safety, however, should not be trumped by Illinois’s desire to
experiment. The current standard is unnecessarily high, and it follows
that some dangerous individuals are not committed under the SVPA
regime when they would be committed under sexual predator laws in
other states.
Another challenge to lowering the commitment standard is that
Illinois would face funding problems. Illinois, however, is currently the
only state that uses “substantially probable” as the standard.233
Numerous other states use “likely” or some variation as their standard
and those states manage to successfully implement their sexual predator
laws.234 If Illinois uses a higher standard than necessary as a means to
avoid the funding required for more civil commitments, Illinois is taking
231
See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the SVPA’s “substantially probable” language is
actually a higher standard than is constitutionally required).
232
See supra Part II.B (discussing the key cases in establishing that sexual predator laws
are constitutional, both of which involved a law using a “likely” standard).
233
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (describing the commitment standards
found in other statutes, none of which are “substantially probable”).
234
See supra notes 99–100 (listing the states that use “likely” as their standard and
explaining that Missouri actually uses “more likely than not” as its standard).
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the position that saving money is more important than public safety.
Illinois would also be effectively acknowledging that committing
sexually violent individuals is not as high a priority in Illinois as it is in
other states.
Additionally, the funding issue is present with whatever type of SVP
control system is used. Sexual predator laws developed because
communities were not satisfied with simply requiring sex offenders to
register.235 State legislatures felt more control was needed because some
individuals will continue to be sexually violent.236 Outpatient therapy is
one option.237 Proponents could argue that this alleviates some of the
burden on the state; however, the relief is small. States are still
responsible for supplying intensive treatment, therapy, food, facilities,
and staff during the day. Consequently, the issue becomes what to do
with sexually violent individuals at night.
If the state is not providing a place for these individuals to live, they
must live elsewhere. With therapy during the day, these individuals
would be forced to work at night in order to pay for living expenses. To
say the least, an employer would be hesitant about hiring someone who
is currently undergoing full-time therapy for a mental disorder that
makes him sexually violent. If the state were to provide job placement
programs and some type of economic incentive for employers to hire
SVPs, it would be an additional burden on the state. Even if an SVP
could somehow find work without state placement or incentive
programs, there would be no time to sleep or do the day-to-day tasks
that independent living requires.
The other option is keeping these individuals in prison through
longer sentences or habitual-offender statutes. Prisons, however, face
underfunding and overpopulation problems in their own right.238 While
civil commitment programs do cost more than prison terms, the added
cost is counter-balanced by the fact that commitment programs,
theoretically, do not last as long because the individuals are treated and
cured.239 An additional problem with a longer prison term is that, unless
235
See supra notes 30–46 and accompanying text (covering the development of sexual
predator laws in the 1990s).
236
See supra note 16 (averring the fact that some individuals will predictably commit
future acts of sexual violence).
237
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.150 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008)
(calling for outpatient treatment under a sexual predator law).
238
See Stockinger, supra note 64 (discussing the funding issues in Illinois prisons); Garcia,
supra note 64 (explaining that Illinois is cutting the prison budget by releasing inmates and
laying off prison workers).
239
See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 26 (stating that civil commitment programs cost
an average of four times as much as keeping sexual predators in prison); supra note 44
(explaining that modern sexual predator laws aim to treat individuals so they can be
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it is life without parole, it ends without treatment.240 Thus, SVPs will at
some point get out of prison and be put back on the streets with the same
mental disorder that they had when the prison term began. In fact, the
Washington law that started the wave of modern sexual predator
legislation was a reaction to a crime committed by a man who had
recently completed his prison sentence and been released.241 The SVPA
is one of the modern sexual predator laws passed in reaction to a broken
system of dealing with sex offenders, and the SVPA could be improved
through a lower commitment standard.242
V. CONCLUSION
The SVPA is a successful law as it is currently written. It has
survived constitutional scrutiny and has been enforced countless times
for well over a decade. Laws must evolve, however, to ensure
continuing success and the SVPA needs an adjustment for 2011 and
beyond. The adjustments proposed in Part IV are ways that the SVPA
could be improved. The change from “substantially probable” to
“likely” would alter the SVPA’s language to a standard that the Illinois
judiciary has acknowledged as being lower than what is currently in
place.243 If Illinois were to implement this change, it would be following
in the footsteps of other states that have already done so. Furthermore,
Illinois would have the opportunity to become a leader in sexual
predator legislation if it gave meaning to the “emotional capacity”
language. By defining “emotional capacity” and committing SVPs
pursuant to a mental disorder based on this capacity, Illinois could create
a new type of SVP.
Thinking back to the story involving Mr. Doe, let us assume that Mr.
Doe has complete control of his behavior.244 Mr. Doe knows what he is
doing and when he is doing it. He chose to abduct the boy who was
walking home. Mr. Doe, however, made this choice because he does not
feel there is anything wrong with sexually abusing children. He did not
rehabilitated and be released); supra note 66 (discussing the procedures of the SVPA,
including a provision allowing for release upon no longer being sexually violent).
240
Adding treatment to a prison term would create the same funding issues raised by
opponents of sexual predator laws and would simply be a different way of doing what
sexual predator laws already do.
241
See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Earl Shriner).
242
See supra notes 30–46 (discussing the development of modern sexual predator
legislation).
243
See supra note 173 and accompanying text (explaining that the standard provided in
the SVPA’s current language is at least as high, if not higher, than the standard approved in
Hendricks).
244
See supra Part I (discussing a hypothetical case involving a man named Mr. Doe).
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feel there was anything wrong with tying up his stepson, nor did he feel
he behaved badly when snatching the little-leaguer. Mr. Doe cannot
control why he feels this way; he simply does. Under the new
interpretation of the SVPA, Mr. Doe could have been found to have a
mental disorder. With the “substantially probable” standard lowered to
“likely,” civilly committing Mr. Doe would have been that much easier.
Without this interpretation and adjustment, however, Mr. Doe served his
time and walked out of prison only to rape the eight-year-old boy
walking home.
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